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∗
Abstract
This paper engages the question Does the consistency of a set of axioms entail the existence of
a model in which they are satisfied? within the frame of the Frege-Hilbert controversy. The
question is related historically to the formulation, proof, and reception of Gödel’s Completeness
Theorem. Tools from mathematical logic are then used to argue that there are precise senses in
which Frege was correct to maintain that demonstrating consistency is as difficult as it can be
but also in which Hilbert was correct to maintain that demonstrating existence given consistency
is as easy as it can be.
1 Introduction
This paper aims to provide a contemporary reappraisal of a well-worn debate in philosophy of
mathematics: does the consistency of a set of axioms or other mathematical statements entail the
existence of a model in which they are satisfied? As most readers will be aware, this forms part of
a complex of issues which has come to be known as the Frege-Hilbert controversy. The controversy
arose as a consequence of the publication in 1899 of David Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie
(1899). This prompted Gottlob Frege to initiate an exchange of letters wherein he and Hilbert
debated a wide range of topics surrounding the axiomatic method, inclusive of the following:1
(1) i) Should axioms be understood as basic truths about a domain or as implicit definitions
of systems of arbitrary objects and relations in which they are satisfied?
ii) What is the relation between the syntactic expression of axioms in a formal language
and the propositions (or thoughts) which they express?
iii) What is the correct method for demonstrating the consistency or logical independence
of a set of axioms?
Certain aspects of how Frege and Hilbert reacted to these questions can be attributed to the
features of the logicist program which Frege had initiated in (1884) and the finitist consistency
program which Hilbert would announce in (1904) and further develop in the 1910s-1930s. More
∗This is an expanded version of a paper delivered to the Aristotelian Society on 15 June 2020 and which will
be published in Volume CXX, No. 3 (2020) of their Proceedings. Thanks are owed to Andrew Arana, Patricia
Blanchette, Michael Detlefsen, Alberto Naibo, and Marco Panza for comments and discussion and to audiences in
South Bend, Saint Andrews, Paris, and London where this material was presented.
1Frege and Hilbert’s letters are reprinted in translation in (Gabriel and MacGuinness 1980).
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generally, however, Frege can be understood as an inheritor of the “traditional” view that geometry
is the study of space while Hilbert was one of the original exponents of the “modern” view that
mathematics in general – and geometry in particular – is concerned with the study of abstract
structures and the statements which they satisfy. The ultimate grounds of their disagreement were
thus deep-seated. But their exchange was also instrumental in bringing into focus a number of
questions which are still with us today.
Most readers will also be aware that the Frege-Hilbert controversy has itself inspired a substantial
literature in contemporary philosophy of mathematics.2 Much of this has focused on how Frege’s
and Hilbert’s views should be understood in the historical context of their exchange. This preceded
by at least 15 years the isolation of many of the features which we now take to be characteristic of
mathematical logic – e.g. a clear distinction between syntax and semantics, deductive and semantic
consequence, or the order of variables and formulas. One concern which pervades the contemporary
discussion of the Frege-Hilbert controversy is thus that of making clear how Frege’s and Hilbert’s
understanding of consistency and existence (as well as attendant notions such as logical consequence,
validity, and independence) differed from currently accepted definitions.
There are indeed risks involved with separating questions like (1i-iii) from the historical milieu
in which Frege and Hilbert debated them. Nonetheless, the perspective which I will adopt in this
paper is that there are also insights to be gained by viewing their controversy in light of subsequent
work in mathematical logic. One reason for adopting this approach is that the sequence of steps
separating Hilbert’s understanding of the notions just mentioned around the time of Grundlagen
der Geometrie and that which he had adopted by the time of Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik
(1928) – which is arguably the first “modern” textbook in mathematical logic – is relatively short.
Another reason is to draw attention to a sequence of mathematical results obtained from the late
1920s onward – some well-known, some less so – which were not only inspired by Frege and Hilbert’s
exchange but can also be used to sharpen our understanding of the grounds of their disagreement
and its contemporary significance (or at least so I will suggest).
Within this frame I will argue for three basic theses:
(2) i) The Frege-Hilbert controversy directly motivated Gödel’s formulation and proof of the
Completeness Theorem for first-order logic as well as informing its reception.
ii) There is a precise sense in which Frege was correct to maintain that the general problem
of demonstrating the consistency of a set of axioms is as difficult as it can be.
iii) There is a precise sense in which Hilbert was correct to maintain that the general
problem of demonstrating the existence of a structure satisfying a set of axioms is as
easy as it can be conditional on their proof-theoretic consistency.
The first of these claims is historical and will be developed in §2 and §3 alongside an overview
of Hilbert’s project in Grundlagen der Geometrie and the developments in metamathematics which
grew out of it. Therein I will highlight in particular the role of Paul Bernays in locating the concerns
which animated Hilbert’s exchange with Frege within the context of what we now call Hilbert’s
program. This includes the task of distilling from Hilbert’s prior work a general technique for
investigating the consistency of arbitrary axiom systems which Bernays referred to as the method of
arithmetization. The isolation of this method anticipates subsequent developments in computability
theory – in particular the proof of the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem by Church and
2(Resnik 1974), (Hallett 1990, 2010), and (Blanchette 1996, 2012) provide paradigmatic waypoints for the present
paper.
2
Turing, the definition of a complete problem by Post, and the introduction of the arithmetical
hierarchy for classifying problems by Kleene – which I will suggest can be naturally brought to bear
on Frege’s remarks about consistency in §4 and Hilbert’s remarks about existence in §5. Finally in
§6 and §7, I will apply these observations to explore some vestiges of the Frege-Hilbert controversy
which linger in contemporary philosophy of mathematics – e.g. in regard to the relationship between
Hilbert’s views and structuralism as well as the gap which I will suggest remains between consistency
and existence in light of the metamathematical interaction of the Completeness Theorem with both
arithmetic and geometry.
2 From the Grundlagen der Geometrie to the Completeness Theorem
The first edition of Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie was based on lecture courses delivered in
Göttingen between 1894 and 1898 and was originally published in 1899 as part of a Festschrift
for Gauss and Weber. To fix some of its contributions which will be relevant here, Hilbert’s own
introduction can be quoted directly:3
Geometry, like arithmetic, requires only a few and simple principles for its logical development. These
principles are called the axioms of geometry . . .¶ . . . This present investigation is a new attempt to
establish for geometry a complete, and as simple as possible, set of axioms and to deduce from them the
most important geometric theorems in such a way that the meaning of the various groups of axioms, as
well as the significance of the conclusions that can be drawn from the individual axioms, come to light.
(Hilbert 1971, p. 2)
Although Hilbert’s axiomatization is in many ways similar to that of Euclid, his choice of
primitive notions and his organization of theorems differ somewhat from that of the Elements. The
language in which he formalizes plane geometry includes the sorts point and line and the binary
relation of incidence (relating a point and a line), the ternary relation of betweenness (relating
triples of points), the 4-ary relation of congruence of line segments (relating two pairs of points),
and the 6-ary relation of congruence of angles (relating two triples of points). Hilbert’s division
of axioms is designed to facilitate not only the reconstruction of some of Euclid’s theorems but
also exploration of the consistency and independence of various subsets of principles. This gives
rise to his organization of axioms into the categories Incidence (I), Order (II), Congruence (III),
Parallels (IV), and Continuity (V). The first three of these respectively pertain to the properties of
the incidence, betweenness, and the two congruence relations. Hilbert took Playfair’s form [PP] of
Euclid’s Fifth Postulate as his parallel axiom. The choice of continuity axioms was subject to the
most revision across the various editions of the Grundlagen. For present purposes, however, I will
take this category to include only the so-called Circle-Circle Intersection Principle [CCP].4
3For more on the context and influence of Grundlagen der Geometrie see the introduction to (Hilbert 1899) in
(Hallett and Majer 2004) and for mathematical reconstructions of the results mentioned below see (Hartshorne 2000).
Page references and numbering below refer to the English translation of the 10th German edition (Hilbert 1971).
Although substantial changes were made between editions, those relevant here will be flagged individually.
4CCP states ‘If from distinct points A and B, circles with radius AC and BD are drawn such that one circle
contains points both in the interior and in the exterior of the other, then they intersect in two points, on opposite
sides of AB’. The explicit inclusion of CCP rather than a stronger principle such as Hilbert’s Axiom of Completeness
or the continuity axioms of Dedekind or Cantor (which appear in later editions of the Grundlagen) among Hilbert’s
axioms is an anachronism (as is the omission of the Archimedean axiom) . But it is useful for understanding the
structure of Hilbert’s independence proofs and (per, e.g., Baldwin 2018) it is also arguably more in keeping with the
aims of the original text.
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Although Hilbert originally expressed his axioms in natural language, the first-order formaliza-
tion of these and related axioms was in fact a frequent source of examples in his later work (as
I will discuss below). And in fact it is straightforward to see how his axioms can be formalized
in a two-sorted first-order language LH with sorts A,B,C . . . for points, ℓ, ℓ′, ℓ′′, . . . for lines and
predicates In(A, ℓ), Btw (A,B,C), Cong1(A,B,C,D), and Cong2(A,B,C,D,E, F ) for incidence,
betweenness, and congruence. I will borrow from Baldwin (2018) the name HP (for ‘Hilbert planes’)
for the theory containing the axioms in groups (I), (II), and (III) formulated in LH .
In the first chapter of (1899), Hilbert illustrates that these axioms are sufficient for developing
plane geometry by proving theorems from Euclid such as side-angle-side congruence for triangles.
He then introduces one of the main goals of the Grundlagen at the beginning of chapter II:
The axioms formulated in the five groups in Chapter I are not contradictory to each other, i.e., it is
impossible to deduce from them by logical inference a result that contradicts one of them. In order to
realize this a set of objects will be constructed from the real numbers in which all axioms of the five
groups are satisfied. (Hilbert 1971, p. 29)
Hilbert then describes how this can be accomplished by constructing a set of real numbers P (denoted
Ω in the original text) which he describes as follows
Consider the field [P] arising from the number 1 and the application of a finite number of times of
the four arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and the fifth operation
|√1 + x2|, where x denotes a number that results from these five operations. (1971, p. 29)
The set P is an example of what is now called an ordered Pythagorean field – i.e. an ordered field
which is also closed under the operation
√
x2 + y2. In fact it is not difficult to see that P is the
minimal such subfield of the real numbers R containing the rational numbers Q with this property.
A similar structure is the minimal Euclidean field E formed by closing Q under the operations of
addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and arbitrary square roots of non-negative elements.
Hilbert next described how the domains of points and lines as well the other predicates of
LH can be interpreted over P. These descriptions collectively determine a structure of the form
P = 〈PP , LP , InP ,BtwP ,CongP1 ,Cong
P
2 〉 via definitions such as the following:
(3) i) PP = the set of ordered pairs A = (x, y) ∈ P2
ii) LP = the set of triples ℓ = (u, v, w) ∈ P3 such that u and v are not both = 0
iii) InP = the set of pairs of points A = (x, y) and lines ℓ = (u, v, w) such that
ux+ vy + w = 0
iv) BtwP = the set of triples of distinct points A = (x1, y1), B = (x2, y2), C = (x3, y3)
incident on the same line ℓ = (u, v, w) and such that x1 < x2 < x3 or x1 > x2 > x3 if
u 6= 0 and v 6= 0 (i.e. the line is not vertical) or if y1 < y2 < y3 or y1 > y2 > y3 otherwise
As Hilbert gave these definitions himself, it is not a major anachronism to understand him as
describing what would now be referred to as an analytical model of LH – i.e. a first-order structure
whose sorts and relational symbols are defined over the real numbers R. But it would be a bigger
stretch to understand him as having precisely anticipated at this stage the inductive definition of
truth in such a structure. What Hilbert did do, however, is to prove informally that various sets of
the axioms he considers are satisfied in P and similar models.
The title of the second chapter of the Grundlagen is ‘The consistency and the mutual indepen-
dence of the axioms’. There can be little doubt that Hilbert understood consistency deductively at
4
this time – i.e. a set of axioms is defined to be consistent if ‘it is impossible to deduce from them
by logical inference a result that contradicts one of them’. But as there is no indication of a formal
proof system in the Grundlagen, there is no apparent way in which he could have expressed the
soundness of ‘logical inference’ as a mathematical theorem at this time. It is clear, however, that
Hilbert also understood that were any of the sets of geometrical axioms he considers deductively
inconsistent, an inconsistency would be transferred by his model constructions into the analytical
domain – i.e.
Every contradiction in the consequences of the line and plane axioms . . . would therefore have to be
detectable in the arithmetic of the field [P]. (1971, p. 30)
Hilbert’s constructions are thus prototypical of what we would now call model theoretic consis-
tency proofs. In fact if we adopt the modern notation M |= Γ to express that the sentences Γ5 are
satisfied in the structureM, then all of the consistency proofs in the Grundlagen can be understood
as conforming to the following model-theoretic consistency test:
(MCT) If Γ is a set of axioms over a language L, then a sufficient condition for the consistency of
Γ is that there exist an L-model M such M |= Γ.
It is also clear that Hilbert understood the concept of independence deductively – i.e. as cor-
responding to the fact ‘that no essential part of anyone of these groups of axioms can be deduced
from the others by logical inference.’ (1971, p. 32). His independence proofs thus took the familiar
form of showing that there exist models in which certain axioms while others are not. Hilbert’s
proofs thus conformed to the following model-theoretic independence test:
(MIT) If Γ is a set of L-sentences and ϕ is an L-sentence, then a sufficient condition for the
independence of ϕ from Γ is that there exist an L-model M such that M |= Γ but M 6|= ϕ.
If we assume that negation is in our language, then the problem of checking the independence
of ϕ from Γ via (MIT) can clearly be reduced to checking the consistency of Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} via (MCT).
Some of the specific results which Hilbert obtained in (1899) can be presented in this way as follows:
(4) i) CCP is independent of HP+PP. This is shown in §37 wherein Hilbert observes that the
model P described in (3) based on the minimal Pythagorean field P is such that
P |= HP+PP+ ¬CCP. On the other hand, he also shows that the model E which is
constructed in the same manner as P starting from the minimal Euclidean field E
satisfies HP+PP+ CCP.6
5Unless otherwise noted, the symbols Γ,∆, . . . should be understood in the sequel as ranging over finite sets of
first-order sentences. Since if Γ = {γ1, . . . , γn} then Γ is equivalent to a single sentence ∧Γ = γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn, results
which were originally formulated for single sentences thus also apply trivially to finitely axiomatizable theories. This
covers almost all of the geometric systems originally considered by Hilbert as well as systems such as Gödel-Bernays
set theory [GB] which are (more than) sufficient to formalize the fragments of analysis involved in Hilbert’s model
constructions. But as will be evident to contemporary readers, many of the results discussed below also hold mutatis
mutandis for computably axiomatizable theories such as ZF as well.
6These results are implicit in Hilbert’s formulation of a general criterion for the possibility of ruler and compass
constructions such as that required to demonstrate Theorem I.1 of Euclid’s Elements – i.e. ‘An equilateral triangle
can be constructed on any given segment’. In §37 this is shown to fail in structures such as P which do not satisfy
CCP. See (Hartshorne 2000, §11), (Hallett and Majer 2004, pp. 204-206), (Hallett 2008, §8.4.3) for discussion of
Hilbert’s engagement with various weakenings of the continuity axioms he considers which (like CCP) are sufficient
to derive this statement.
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ii) PP is independent of HP+CCP. This is demonstrated in §10 wherein it is shown that
within the model E it is possible to define another structure O |= HP+CCP+ ¬PP.7
The foregoing by no means exhaust the mathematical contributions of the Grundlagen. But
it is precisely these results and their demonstrations which originally caught Frege’s eye in his
correspondence with Hilbert. It is difficult to summarize their exchange in a manner which does
justice to the broad range of issues in the background. But the following passages from Frege’s first
letter [IV/3] to Hilbert about geometry all bear on issues which will be of concern below:8
I was interested to get to know your Festschrift on the foundations of geometry, the more so as I myself
had earlier been concerned with them, but without publishing anything. As was to be expected, there
are many points of contact between my earlier unrealized attempts and your account, but also many
divergencies. In particular, I thought I could make do with fewer primitive terms. (p. 34)
The explanations of [§1, p. 3 and §3, pp. 5-6] are apparently of a very different kind, for here the
meanings of the words ‘point’, ‘line’, ‘between’ are not given, but are assumed to be known in advance.
At least it seems so. But it is also left unclear what you call a point. One first thinks of points
in the sense of Euclidean geometry, a thought reinforced by the proposition that the axioms express
fundamental facts of our intuition. But afterwards [§9, p. 29] you think of a pair of numbers as a point.
(p. 35)
I call axioms propositions that are true but are not proved because our knowledge of them flows from
a source very different from the logical source, a source which might be called spatial intuition. From
the truth of the axioms it follows that they do not contradict one another. There is therefore no need
for a further proof. (p. 37)
The first two of these passages respectively introduce the fact that Frege had previously con-
sidered axiomatizing geometry on the basis of different non-logical terms than those employed by
Hilbert and also that he assigned a more significant role to intuition in characterizing geometric
axioms. I will return to these aspects of the controversy below. But it is the third passage which
introduces the theme which will be initially relevant here – i.e. since for Frege axioms have to
correspond to true propositions about a given domain, once a given set of propositions are accepted
as axioms, it follows without the need for additional proof that they are consistent.
Hilbert [IV/4] replied to Frege as follows about this point:
You write: ‘I call axioms propositions . . . From the truth of the axioms it follows that they do not
contradict one another.’ I found it very interesting to read this very sentence in your letter, for as long
as I have been thinking, writing and lecturing on these things, I have been saying the exact reverse: if
the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict one another with all their consequences, then they are
true and the things defined by the axioms exist. This is for me the criterion of truth and existence.
(p. 39)
This is among the most commonly quoted passages in the correspondence and is also largely respon-
sible for the slogan ‘consistency implies existence’ which has come to be associated with Hilbert.
But although such a view is often understood as a cornerstone of Hilbert’s foundational standpoint,
7This construction is described only briefly in the text. However in the lectures (Hallett and Majer 2004, pp.
347-359) on which (1899) is based, Hilbert had presented in more detail the so-called Poincaré disk model O of
hyperbolic geometry which has as its points PO those of E inside a fixed circle C centered at point O and as its lines
LO those sets of points in PO lying on circles which are orthogonal to C or which lie on diameters of C. See also
(Hartshorne 2000, §39).
8Both the labeling of letters and the page numbering below refer to the reprinting of Frege and Hilbert’s cor-
respondence in (Gabriel and MacGuinness 1980). I have also adapted the page and section of Frege’s references to
Grundlagen der Geometrie to match those in (Hilbert 1971).
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the early date of the correspondence should also be kept in mind. For as I will discuss further in
§3, his views on mathematical existence appear to have evolved substantially in light of the finitist
consistency program he would later announce.9
This point will bear directly on the case I will give for theses (2ii,iii) below. It is also related to
another of Frege’s concerns which emerges in his second letter to Hilbert:
[W]e must ask, What means have we of demonstrating that certain . . . requirements . . . do not contradict
one another? The only means I know is this: to point to an object that has all those properties, to give
a case where all those requirements are satisfied. It does not seem possible to demonstrate the lack of
contradiction in any other way. (p. 43)
Frege is here using ‘requirement’ in something like the postulational sense in which he takes Hilbert
to be using the term ‘axiom’. What he is saying in this passage (and others to be considered
below) can thus be understood as suggesting that the existence of a satisfying structure is in fact a
necessary condition to show the consistency of a set of propositions. It hence seems reasonable to
understand him as holding that any suitable criterion for consistency must impose a condition at
least as stringent as (MCT) and similarly for independence with respect to (IT).
Hilbert’s consistency and independence proofs in (1899) satisfy these criteria in an apparently
paradigmatic way. The fact that Frege was still dissatisfied with them attests to the fact that he
wished to impose a yet stricter criteria. The task of precisely articulating the additional conditions
which Frege wished to enforce is delicate. However it is generally agreed that Frege’s reservations
derived in part from his understanding of axioms not as sentences (i.e. linguistic items) but rather
what he called thoughts (i.e. non-linguistic entities closer to propositions). He also held that
thoughts have a determinate subject matter and thus do not to admit to reinterpretation of the
expression which we employ to express them. Thus although Frege can be understood as acknowl-
edging that results like (4i-iii) present models satisfying various axiom systems in Hilbert’s sense
(i.e. sets of sentences), he still maintained that these models are not of the right sort to demonstrate
consistency of the systems in his own sense (i.e. sets of thoughts). In particular, Hilbert’s models
are not composed from geometrical points and lines which Frege took to be expressed by the terms
‘point’ and ‘line’ but rather from pairs and triples of real numbers over fields like P or E.10
I will return to this (familiar) component of the ideological background which separated Frege
from Hilbert in §4. But it is equally notable that already at the time of his exchange with Frege,
Hilbert had himself become dissatisfied with (MCT) and (IT) as ultimate criteria for consistency
and independence. This concern comes almost to the surface in one of Frege’s subsequent letters
[IV/7] in which he thanks Hilbert for sending him a copy of his address ‘Mathematische Probleme’
(1900a) and then presses him for further details on another technique which Hilbert alludes to
9Another complication in basing a case for Hilbert’s acceptance of the slogan on this passage is that he suggests
here that the consistency of axioms entails not just the existence of a model in which they are satisfied but also
their truth. On the other hand in a contemporaneous formulation of a similar point Hilbert fails to mention truth
in conjunction with existence : ‘[I]f it can be proved that the attributes assigned to the concept can never lead to
a contradiction by the application of a finite number of logical processes, I say that the mathematical existence of
the concept . . . is thereby proved’ (1900a, p. 10). Some evidence that Hilbert had in mind something closer to the
contemporary notion of ‘truth in a structure’ (rather than ‘truth simpliciter’) is also provided by how he continued
in his reply to Frege: ‘The proposition “Every equation has a root” is true, and the existence of a root is proven,
as soon as the axiom “Every equation has a root” can be added to the other arithmetical axioms, without raising
the possibility of contradiction, no matter what conclusions are drawn. This conception is indeed the key to an
understanding of . . . my Festschrift . . .’ (IV/4, p.40) (Note that while the statement in question is false in the real
field R, its consistency is attested to by the fact it becomes true in the complex field C.)
10For more on these points see (Blanchette 1996, 2012).
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there.11 The passage about which Frege was inquiring is most likely the following:
In geometry, the proof of the compatibility of the axioms can be effected by constructing a suitable
field of numbers, such that analogous relations between the numbers of this field correspond to the
geometrical axioms. Any contradiction in the deductions from the geometrical axioms must thereupon
be recognizable in the arithmetic of this field of numbers. In this way the desired proof for the com-
patibility of the geometrical axioms is made to depend upon the theorem of the compatibility of the
arithmetical axioms.
On the other hand a direct method is needed for the proof of the compatibility of the arithmetical
axioms. The axioms of arithmetic are essentially nothing else than the known rules of calculation, with
the addition of the axiom of continuity . . . I am convinced that it must be possible to find a direct proof
for the compatibility of the arithmetical axioms, by means of a careful study and suitable modification
of the known methods of reasoning in the theory of irrational numbers. (1900a, p. 1104)
Hilbert here takes five steps in quick succession: i) he summarizes the technique of his geomet-
ric consistency proofs in a manner which is reminiscent of the modern notion of model theoretic
interpretability (see §3); ii) he observes that this method provides a means of converting any po-
tential proof of a contradiction from the geometric axioms into a contradictory proposition about
the relevant numerical fields – i.e that the model constructions described above provide only rel-
ative consistency proofs (as we would now put it); iii) he alludes to the fact that he has recently
introduced an axiomatic theory for reasoning about real numbers relative to which the prior step
can be made precise; iv) he states that unlike in the case of geometry, the consistency of this other
axiomatization must be proven ‘directly’ rather than via interpretation; v) he indicates a direction
by which an appropriately ‘direct’ proof of the consistency of analysis might be found.
As I will discuss further in §3, it is fair to say that points i) and ii) reflect the consensus view
of the contribution of Grundlagen der Geometrie. With respect to point iii), it appears likely that
Hilbert had also sent Frege a copy of his paper ‘Über den Zahlbegriff’ (1900b) in which an axiom
system similar to what we would now call analysis (or second-order arithmetic) is indeed presented.
The situation with respect to iv) and v) is more complicated. For Hilbert failed at this time to
provide either a characterization of what he meant by a ‘direct consistency proof’ as distinct from
(MCT) or anything more than a promissory note that such a proof would be forthcoming. It was
thus quite reasonable of Frege to press Hilbert for further details.
Despite the confidence he projected, the prior passage forms part of the announcement of what
later became known as Hilbert’s second problem (cf., e.g., Kreisel 1976). While the exchange just
recorded effectively marked the end of Hilbert’s correspondence with Frege, we now know that it
would take 25 years of work before it would be possible to provide a satisfactory characterization
of what form such a proof might take. On the other hand, Hilbert’s announcement of this goal also
anticipated the development of what he would come to call metamathematics within a stream of
developments which would come to include Gödel’s proof of the Completeness Theorem in 1929.
As many of the intervening events are well-known (and aptly described in Sieg 2013, I.3 and in the
introduction to Ewald and Sieg 2013), it will suffice to summarize a few points from the intervening
years.
11‘It seems to me that you believe yourself to be in possession of a principle for proving lack of contradiction which
is essentially different from the one I formulated in my last letter and which, if I remember right, is the only one you
apply in your [1899]. If you were right in this, it could be of immense importance, though I do not believe in it as
yet, but suspect that such a principle can be reduced to the one I formulated and that it cannot therefore have a
wider scope than mine. It would help to clear up matters if in your reply to my last letter . . . you could formulate
such a principle precisely and perhaps elucidate its application by an example.’ [IV/7], pp. 49-50
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With the exception of his (1904) address ‘Über die Grundlagen der Logik und der Arithmetik’
– which anticipates several aspects of his finitist consistency program – Hilbert worked mostly
on mathematical physics until the late 1910s, at which time he began offering lecture courses on
the foundations of mathematics. The intervening years had seen Poincare’s critique of Hilbert’s
use of induction in the consistency proof which is sketched in (1904), the publication of Principia
Mathematica, and Hilbert’s own engagement with the paradoxes, logicism, and type theory in light
of Principia.12 Hilbert reacted to these developments starting in his 1917-1918 lectures ‘Prinzipien
der Mathematik’ by proposing that the axiomatic method he had developed for geometry should be
extended to all of mathematics. His lectures also take significant steps towards modern mathematical
logic in terms of precision and a clear delineation between propositional, first-order, and higher-order
logic.
Hilbert was aided in these steps by Paul Bernays whom he had hired as his assistant for the
foundations of mathematics in 1917. Amongst Bernays’s duties was to prepare protocols of Hilbert’s
lectures. This informed his (second) Habilitationschrift (1918) on the propositional calculus in
which Bernays formulated and proved soundness and completeness in the contemporary manner –
i.e. ‘Every provable formula is universally valid, and conversely’ (p. 236).13 On this basis Bernays
additionally observed that soundness implies that the calculus is consistent – i.e. ‘it is not possible to
derive both a formula and its negation’ – and decidable – i.e. that there exists a ‘uniform procedure
by which can one decide for every formula of the calculus after a finite number of steps whether or
not the expression is provable’ (p. 240).
The major development separating Bernays’s propositional proof from Gödel’s first-order one
was the publication of Hilbert and Ackermann’s textbook Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik in
1928. This was Gödel’s source for his dissertation (1929) and consolidates many of the advances
made by Hilbert and his collaborators during the 1920s. These include an axiomatization of first-
and second-order logic extending that which Bernays had used for propositional logic and the
formulations of the formal definitions of provability (Γ ⊢ ϕ) and consistency (Γ 6⊢ ⊥) for these
systems.14 These formalisms are distinguished from Russelian type theory (e.g. with respect to the
dispensability of the Axiom of Reducibility) and shown to be sufficient for the axiomatization of
several portions of mathematics – inclusive of fragments of geometry (§III.10) and analysis (§IV.8).
Hilbert and Ackermann also extended the notion of universal validity [Allgemeingültigkeit] which
had been employed by Bernays – i.e. a statement ‘which always yields a true statement for any
interpretation of the variables’ – to first-order logic. This is used to demonstrate the consistency
of the first-order axioms and to illustrate the validity and non-validity of a number of specific
first-order formulas via the construction of arithmetical models and counter-models (§III.9-10). No
12On which see (Mancosu 2003).
13Page references are to Bernays’s Habilitationschrift as reprinted (Ewald and Sieg 2013) (which also contains
Hilbert’s lectures). Hilbert had previously originally shown that the propositional calculus has the property now
known as Post completeness – i.e. if any unprovable formula is added to the axioms as a schema, then the calculus
becomes inconsistent. It is now natural to view this as a corollary of deductive completeness as formulated by Bernays
– i.e. every valid formula is provable. However Post completeness bears an obvious resemblance to the property of
descriptive completeness which Hilbert had hoped to capture by his so-called Vollständigkeit axiom in the second
edition of the Grundlagen der Geometrie – i.e. ‘To a system of points, straight lines, and planes, it is impossible
to add other elements in such a manner that the system thus generalized shall form a new geometry obeying all
of the five groups of axioms’ (p. 25). See (Zach 1999), (Detlefsen 2014), and (Baldwin 2018, §11) for more on the
relationship between these and several other notions of completeness which are relevant to this historical context.
14In fact Hilbert and Ackermann (1928, §I.10, §III.5) provided the original definition for what we now call the
‘Hilbert system’ for first-order logic.
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formal definition of truth in a model or of logical consequence is stated. But the approach adopted
for demonstrating first-order validity and consequence are all compatible with the contemporary
definitions of |= ϕ and Γ |= ϕ now associated with Tarski – i.e. ϕ is valid if it is true in all models
and ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ just in case it is true in models in which Γ is satisfied.15
The most enduring contribution of the Grundzüge may be Hilbert and Ackermann’s explicit for-
mulation of the completeness and decidability of their axioms for first-order logic as open problems.
These are respectively stated in the text as follows:
Whether the axiom system is complete at least in the sense that really all logical formulas that are
correct for all domains of individuals can be derived from it is an unsolved question. We can only say
purely empirically that this axiom system has always sufficed for any application. (p. 68)
The decision problem [Entscheidungsproblem] is solved if one knows a procedure, which permits the
decision of the universal validity or satisfiability of a given logical expression by finitely many operations.
The solution of the problem of decision is of fundamental importance to the theory of all domains whose
propositions can be logically described using finitely many axioms.16 (pp. 73-74)
As we have seen, Bernays had answered the analogous versions of these questions in the positive
for the propositional calculus. And while Church and Turing would later provide a negative answer
to the latter (to which I will return in §4), Gödel promptly answered the former positively in his
dissertation. As this was juxtaposed between the publication of the Grundzüge in 1928 and his
announcement of his incompleteness theorems in late 1930, the context which Gödel navigates in
its introductory section is quite complex. But as the following passage makes clear, it is evident
that he understood the significance of his result relative to the issues which had been brought into
the open by Frege’s exchange with Hilbert:17
Here ‘completeness’ is to mean that every valid [allgemein giltige] formula expressible in the restricted
functional calculus can be derived from the axioms by means of a finite sequence of formal inferences.
This assertion can easily be seen to be equivalent to the following: Every consistent axiom system
consisting of only [first-order formulas] has a realization. (Here ‘consistent’ means that no contradiction
can be derived by means of finitely many formal inferences.) The latter formulation seems also to be
of some interest in itself, since the solution of this question represents in a certain sense a theoretical
completion of the usual method for proving consistency . . . for it would give us a guarantee that in
every case this method leads to its goal, that is, that one must either be able to produce a contradiction
or prove the consistency by means of a model. L. E. Brouwer, in particular, has emphatically stressed
that from the consistency of an axiom system we cannot conclude without further ado that a model
can be constructed. But one might perhaps think that the existence of the notions introduced through
an axiom system is to be defined outright by the consistency of the axioms and that, therefore, a proof
has to be rejected out of hand. (Gödel 1929, p. 61)
15See (Ewald and Sieg 2013, pp. 44-45) for discussion of how logical validity is understood in in these sources.
16Appearing immediately after this passage in the first edition of the Grundzüge (pp. 74-76) is a example which
Hilbert and Ackermann use to illustrate the importance of the Entscheidungsproblem – i.e. the question of whether
what they call Pascal’s Theorem (a projective form of Pappus’s Theorem) is provable from Hilbert’s Order, Incidence,
and Parallels axioms alone. This is formulated in detail by first showing how Pascal’s Theorem (ϕ) and the axioms
(Γ) and can be formulated in a first-order language similar to that described above. In (1899) Hilbert had shown that
ϕ is not entailed by Γ (i.e. essentially Γ 6|= ϕ) in the course of showing the equivalence of Pascal’s Theorem with the
commutativity of multiplication in the so-called skew field constructed from a geometry satisfying the Axiom groups
I, II, IV via the segment arithmetic described in §14-§15. Hilbert and Ackermann go on to illustrate the significance
of the Entscheidungsproblem by observing that if the problem were solved in the positive then this rather involved
construction could be replaced by an algorithmic demonstration that 6⊢ ∧Γ→ ϕ.
17See the introduction to (Gödel 1929), (Kennedy 2011), and (Baldwin 2018, §4.2) for more on the context of
Gödel’s dissertation. It will also be useful to note here that the sort of failure of completeness for second-order
theories which Gödel anticipated in the Königsberg lecture in which he first announced Theorem 2.1 will not be
relevant here until §6.
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Although Gödel mentions neither Frege nor Hilbert by name, there can be little doubt that by
‘the usual method for proving consistency’ Gödel had in mind what Hilbert and Bernays (1934)
would later called ‘the method of exhibition’ (and has here been called MCT). It is thus also
significant that he appears to acknowledge the potential cogency of each of the following positions:
i) Consistency automatically entails the existence of a satisfying model – i.e. if Γ is consistent,
then the existence of M |= Γ follows ‘without further ado’.
ii) Consistency is insufficient on its own to entail the existence of a satisfying model – i.e. even if
Γ 6⊢ ⊥, then the existence of M |= Γ only follows ‘with further ado’ (and thus potentially not
at all).
We have seen that Hilbert at one time endorsed a version of i) whereas Frege himself emphatically
stressed ii). But independently of their philosophical debate, it is also important to keep in mind
that the result which Gödel described in the foregoing passage and then proceeded to prove can be
understood to have the following form:18
Theorem 2.1. If a set of axioms Γ is consistent (Γ 6⊢ ⊥), then there exists a model M in which Γ
is satisfied (M |= Γ).
As Gödel evidently realized, such a result can naturally be taken to provide mathematical
confirmation of the slogan ‘consistency implies existence’. But whereas in (1900a) Hilbert introduced
the slogan almost glibly, we have also seen that by the mid-1920s he had come to an understanding
on which this statement both admits to a precise mathematical formulation and also that relative
to this formulation it requires proof. On the other hand, Gödel himself does not appear to share
the reservations with accepting the principle of the sort he attributes to Brouwer but we will see
also came to be shared by Hilbert (at least in some sense). But at the same time, it is also easy to
appreciate why Gödel would have wished to stress that the correctness of the slogan notwithstanding,
there is indeed some ‘ado’ involved with actually showing that every consistent set of first-order
sentences has a model. This point will be further borne out in light of the further metamathemtical
analysis of the Completeness Theorem to be considered below.
3 Bernays and method of arithmetization
We have seen that Hilbert’s consistency proofs in Grundlagen der Geometrie took the form of
model constructions whereby a set of axioms Γ is shown to be consistent by describing a structure
M |= Γ. In the case where Γ includes at least the axioms of Incidence and Order, Hilbert observed
that the domain of M must already be infinite (1971, p. 8). However he also stressed that the
models employed in demonstrations (4i-ii) are all countable (p. 41) and also obtained by closing the
natural numbers under what he described as the ‘calculating operations’ [Rechnungsoperationen]
of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division together with extraction of square roots (p.
18Indeed it was in this contraposed form that Gödel stated and proved the completeness of first-order logic: ‘The
completeness theorem that we must now prove states . . .: Every valid logical expression is provable. Clearly, this
can also be expressed thus: Every logical expression is either satisfiable or refutable, and we shall prove it in this
form.’ (1929, pp. 74-75). In the address in which Gödel originally announced the Completeness Theorem he would
also go on to briefly indicate an argument why it is does not apply to higher-order logic (1930, p. 29). His argument
goes via the now well-known observation that his incompleteness theorems can be combined with the provable to
categoricity of the axioms of second-order arithmetic [PA2] to show that there can be standard second-order model
of (presumably) consistent theories like PA2+¬Con(PA2). I will return to discuss the significance of this observation
to contemporary considerations in §6 (see also note 19 in regard its bearing on geometry).
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29, p. 102). Thus despite the fact that these models are naturally termed analytical (in the sense
that their domain and relations are comprised of objects defined over the real numbers R), it is also
understandable why Hilbert’s models are considered as steppingstones to what are now known as
arithmetical models (whose domain and relations are defined over the natural numbers N).19
Hilbert’s work in geometry was taken into account in a series of expository papers by Bernays in
the 1920s-mid-1930s (several of which are reprinted in 1976a). Taken together with the introductory
chapters of the first volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik (1934), these accounts locate this work
relative to the mature form of what is now referred to as Hilbert’s program in the foundations
of mathematics. I will return to some of the specific characteristics of the program in regard to
geometry in §5. But for the moment it will suffice to recall that its goal is typically described as
that of proving the consistency of ‘infinitary mathematics’ from the so-called ‘finitary standpoint’
of ‘contentual [inhaltliche] mathematics’. Infinitary mathematics can here be taken to correspond
to systems of analysis or set theory of the sort in which Hilbert’s work in geometry or mathematical
physics can be formalized. On the other hand, Hilbert paradigmatically characterized finitary
mathematics in terms of concrete operations performed on ‘numbers signs’ typified by calculations
involving the ‘construction and deconstruction’ of numerals in stroke notation. Such operations
were often described as ‘intuitive’ rather than ‘logical’. But in mature formulations of the program,
an effort was also made to characterize finitary reasoning axiomatically via systems resembling (but
also occasionally extending) what is now known as Primitive Recursive Arithmetic [PRA].20
It was against this backdrop in which Bernays introduced the expression ‘the method of arithme-
tization’ in his (1930) paper ‘Die Philosophie der Mathematik und die Hilbertsche Beweistheorie’:21
We thus come to a differentiation between the elementary mathematical standpoint and a systematic
19Although it will be useful to retain the distinction between analytical and arithmetical models here, Bernays
(1967) used the latter term to describe the models constructed in the Grundlagen der Geometrie itself (as have
other commentators). It should be noted in this regard that models constructed in service of proving results like
(4i,ii) are only required to satisfy weak continuity principles like CCP. Once stronger principles such as Hilbert’s
Vollständigkeitsaxiom or the completeness axioms of Cantor or Dedekind are added, then the systems cease to have
countable models presuming these principles are interpreted as second-order axioms (rather than first-order schema)
and also that the so-called standard semantics for second-order logic is employed. But Hilbert did not make further
use of these principles in the Grundlagen and they are not needed for the results discussed here. It will also become
clear below it is also possible to view such stronger principles as being satisfied in (countable Henkin) models of
second-order arithmetic of the sort now studied in Reverse Mathematics.
20Recall that PRA is formulated in a first-order language containing terms for all primitive recursive functions and
is axiomatized by their defining equations together with the induction schema for quantifier-free formulas. See (Tait
2005, §1-§2) and (Dean and Walsh 2017, §2) for more on the relationship between Hilbert’s finitism and PRA.
21The expression ‘the method of arithmetization’ is now often used to refer in a narrow sense to Gödel’s (1931) so-
called ‘arithmetization of syntax’. But as is evident from this and related passages, Bernays understood the method
in a broader sense which derives part of its motivation from Kronecker’s general views about the fundamental
role played by natural numbers in mathematics but also subsumes the specific techniques developed by Dedekind,
Weierstrass, and Cantor for the arithmetizaiton of analysis. He would later suggest in the first volume of Grundlagen
der Mathematik (1934, pp. 2-3, pp. 17-18) – wherein ‘Methode der Arithmetisierung’ appears as an indexed term
– that its sense can be precisified in terms of something akin to the modern notion of interpretability in a number
theoretic theory (possibly of the second-order – cf. Hilbert and Bernays 1939, Sup. IV). Bernays would go on to
invoke the method repeatedly in his mathematical work – e.g. when he presents Gödel’s technique for coding syntax
in arithmetic in the second volume (1939, §4) he thus treats it as an application of the method of arithmetization to
metamathematics rather than coextensive with the method itself. But it should also be kept in mind that Bernays
also drew attention to the limitations of the method – e.g. in (1941, p. 152) he writes that ‘the arithmetization of
geometry in analysis and set theory is not complete’ and in (1970, p. 65) that ‘concepts such as those of a continuous
curve and of a surface, as developed especially in topology, can probably not be reduced to the idea of number’. See,
however, note 49 below.
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standpoint that goes beyond it. This differentiation is not drawn artificially or merely ad hoc, but rather
it corresponds to the duality of the points of departure that lead to arithmetic, namely, on the one hand
the combinatorial activity with ratios in discrete quantities [mit Verhältnissen im Diskreten] and on
the other hand the theoretical demand that is placed on mathematics from geometry and physics. The
system of arithmetic does not emerge only from a constructive and intuitively contemplating activity
[konstruierenden und anschaulich betrachtenden Tätigkeit], but rather mostly from the task to grasp
exactly and master theoretically the geometric and physical ideas of set, area, tangent, velocity, etc. The
method of arithmetization is a means to this end. In order to serve this purpose, however, arithmetic
must extend its methodical point of view from the original elementary standpoint of number theory to
a systematic view in the sense of the aforementioned postulates. (p. 253)
Bernays here makes a number of points which can be understood not only to refine those of
Hilbert (1900a) but which also bear on the legacy of the Frege-Hilbert controversy. First, the
central role of arithmetical models in providing consistency proofs is reaffirmed and generalized to
include not just geometry but also applications of infinitary mathematics in physics. Second, the
importance of arithmetic itself comes into sharper focus as it is now assigned the dual role of both
helping to characterize finitary mathematics – i.e. ‘the combinatorial activity with ratios in discrete
quantities’ – and also of ‘mastering theoretically’ concepts from other domains such as geometry and
physics. Finally, it is acknowledged that in order to achieve this purpose the ‘elementary standpoint’
of number theory needs to be extended in order to encompass ‘the aforementioned postulates’ – a
reference to analysis which Bernays takes to include ‘the idea of an infinite totality [that] cannot
be verified by intuition [but is graspable] only in the sense of an idea-formation.’ (1930, p. 252)
By the late 1920s Hilbert and his collaborators had indeed developed additional proof-theoretic
techniques for proving consistency to which I will return in §4. But within the realm of model-
theoretic proofs, they also introduced a systematic distinction between two kinds of axioms sets:
(5) i) Axioms Γ which can be be shown to be consistent in the manner of (MCT) by
presenting a M |= Γ with a finite domain.
ii) Axioms Γ for which it can be shown that any model M |= Γ must have an infinite
domain (presuming that Γ is satisfiable at all).
Hilbert and Ackermann (1928) observed that it is possible to extend the method of arithmetical
interpretations which Bernays (1918) had employed to demonstrate the consistency of the proposi-
tional calculus to also demonstrate the consistency of the axioms for first-order logic in the manner
of (5i) by observing that the axioms are satisfied in a one element model and the rules preserve truth.
However they also observed that the significance of their consistency proof should not be overesti-
mated as in the case where Γ contains mathematical axioms satisfying (5ii) it provides ‘absolutely
no assurance’ of consistency. About this circumstance they go on to observe
This problem, whose solution is of fundamental importance for mathematics, is incomparably more
difficult than the question dealt with here. The mathematical axioms actually assume an infinite domain
of individuals, and there are connected with the concept of infinity the difficulties and paradoxes which
play a role in the discussion of the foundations of mathematics. (1928, p. 65-66)
As Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik was the source for Gödel’s dissertation, such observations
presumably informed what he meant by the ‘usual method of proving consistency’ (1929). But
consideration of the contrast between (5i) and (5ii) also figured prominently in how the general
consistency problem was framed by Hilbert and Bernays at the beginning of the first volume of the
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Grundlagen der Mathematik.22 Therein, the process of demonstrating consistency in the manner
of i) is referred to as the ‘method of exhibition’ according to which ‘the finite domain of individuals
together with the graphs chosen for the predicates . . . constitutes a model in which we can concretely
point out that the axioms are satisfied’ (1934, p. 12). Proofs of this sort are contrasted with those
in which Γ satisfies (5ii) which they refer to as instances of formal axiomatics (the characterization
of which I will discuss further in §5). In this case, they remark
We are therefore forced to investigate the consistency of theoretical systems without considering actu-
ality, and thus we find ourselves already at the standpoint of formal axiomatics. ¶ Now, one usually
treats this problem – both in geometry and the disciplines of physics – with the method of arithmetiza-
tion. The objects of a theory are represented by numbers or systems of numbers and the basic relations
by equations or inequations, such that, on the basis of this translation, the axioms of the theory turn
out either as arithmetical identities or provable sentences . . . or as a system of conditions whose joint
satisfiability can be demonstrated via arithmetical existence sentences . . . This approach presupposes
the validity of arithmetic, i.e. the theory of real numbers (analysis). And so we come to ask ourselves
what kind of validity this is. (1934, p. 3)
The last sentence of this passage again foretells of the developments in proof theory which are
presented in the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik. But it also provides further details
both on how the method of arithmetization operates and how it might be used to mediate between
the infinitary structures – consideration of which Hilbert & Bernays took be necessary for the
development of geometry and physics – and their representation in forms accessible to intuition.
Contemporary readers are also likely to see in such passages a yet more explicit precedent for the
concept of interpretability as we have already seen is employed in Hilbert’s geometric consistency
proofs. For not only are the domains of points and line in his models countable, but they also form
subsets of the real numbers which are definable by formulas in language L2
Z
of second-order arith-
metic (or ‘analysis’ as it is also called) – i.e. the language L1
Z
= {0,+,×, <} of first-order arithmetic
supplemented with second-order quantifiers intended to range over the powerset of N – as are the
extensions of the non-logical expressions of LH . For instance relative to a particular means of formal-
izing real numbers in this language, it is possible to view the model P |= HP as arising from a par-
ticular set of L2
Z
-formulas π(x, y), λ(x, y, z), ι(A, ℓ), β(A,B,C), κ1 (A,B,C,D), κ2(A,B,C,D,E, F )
which respectively define the sorts of points and lines over the minimal Pythagorean field P ⊆ R
and the corresponding relations of incidence, betweenness, and congruence.
There are, however, a number of different notions which go by the name ‘interpretability’ in
mathematical logic. Some of these are syntactic and relate pairs of theories and others are semantic
and relate pairs of models. Paradigmatic of these classes are the following definitions:23
22Although officially joint with Hilbert, Bernays is generally credited as being the primary author of Grundlagen
der mathematik. On the other hand, the views expressed in the introductory chapters of the first volume (§1 and §2)
largely conform to Hilbert’s published addresses and lectures from the around this time. I will thus adopt the following
convention below: i) general philosophical views expressed in this portion of the first volume will be attributed jointly
to Hilbert and Bernays; ii) the details of the development of metamathematics in the second volume – inclusive of
the proof of Theorem 3.1 and attendant reflections – will be attributed individually to Bernays.
23The first of these definitions is the notion now called relative interpretability. This definition is traditionally
credited to Tarski et al. (1953, §I.V). However a specific case of this definition was employed by Ackermann (1937)
to show the consistency of ZF set theory with the Axiom of Infinity negated relative to first-order Peano arithmetic.
Variants of the second definition can be found under different names in many sources. But the consensus seems to be
that model theoretic interpretability is a folklore notion with historical antecedents including Descartes’ identification
of points in the Euclidean plane and pairs of real numbers on which Hilbert’s constructions build.
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(6) i) A theory S is proof-theoretically interpretable in a theory T just in case there is a map
(·)∗ : LS → LT which associates the non-logical symbols of LS with formulas of LT
defining objects of the same types, together with a domain predicate δ(x) such that if
ϕ∗ denotes the result of replacing the LS-symbols in ϕ with their images under (·)∗ in
LT and restricting quantifiers by δ(x) then the following holds:
For all ϕ ∈ LS, if S ⊢ ϕ, then T ⊢ ϕ∗.
ii) A structure A is model-theoretically interpretable in a structure B with domain B just
in case there exists a map (·)∗ : LA → LB associating the primitive expressions of LA
with those of LB and a domain predicate δ(x) as in (6i) such that the LA-structure A∗
with domain A∗ = {a ∈ B : B |= δ(a)} ⊆ B and with non-logical symbols similarly
interpreted in B by their images under (·)∗ – e.g. PA
∗
= {~a ∈ Bk : B |= P ∗(~a)} ⊆ Bk for
a k-ary predicate P – is such that A∗ is isomorphic to A.
A number of authors have suggested that Hilbert’s geometric consistency and independence
proofs may be reconstructed in terms of one or the other of these notions.24 But the pattern of
the proofs in (1899) does not exactly conform to either of these templates. For while we have
seen that Hilbert describes the systems of geometry which are to be interpreted with sufficient
precision to treat them as first-order theories extending HP, he did not concern himself with showing
that their images under the translation scheme described above are provable in an interpreting
theory of analysis (as is required for reconstruction via 6i). And while we have seen that Hilbert’s
model constructions are also specified with adequate precision to treat them as defining interpreting
analytical models, he says little to suggest that he viewed geometric theories as coming along with
synthetic models which are interpreted in such structures (as is required for reconstruction via 6ii).
It is perhaps possible to read into Hilbert’s failure to substantially discuss synthetic interpreta-
tions of geometry a number of morals relevant to the Frege-Hilbert controversy.25 But already in
(1899, §13) Hilbert had given a version of the axioms for analysis he would later present in (1900b).
Additional evidence that he ultimately came to understand his geometric results in terms of some-
thing like proof-theoretic interpretability is provided by the prior passage from (1934) wherein it is
explicitly noted that geometrical axioms may be translated into provable arithmetical statements.
This is exactly what is required for a proof-theoretic interpretation but is left out in (1899).
Separating Grundlagen der Geometrie from Grundlagen der Mathematik is not only the work
in metamathematics surveyed in §2 but also Hilbert’s engagement with the foundational problems
specifically posed by infinitary mathematics. The locus classicus for his discussion of such matters
is his address ‘Über der Unendliche’ (1925). This was also based on a lecture course with the
same name which Hilbert had given in Göttingen in 1924-1925 in which a broad range of themes
are developed. But what is most relevant here is how the contrast between cases (5i) and (5ii) is
repeatedly used to motivate Hilbert’s finitist consistency program as described above. The following
24See, e.g., (Hallett 2010, §3.3) for a reconstruction using definition (6i) and (Eder and Schiemer 2018, §4.3) for a
reconstruction using (6ii).
25Although in the introduction to (1899) Hilbert describes geometry as ‘equivalent to the logical analysis of our
perception of space’ (p. 3), the term ‘spatial geometry’ [räumlichen Geometrie] is then immediately repurposed as an
expression to denote arbitrary models of Hilbert’s axioms for planes as well as points and lines. Notably absent from
Grundlagen der Geometrie are thus descriptions of ‘Euclidean space’, ‘projective space’, etc. which Frege presumably
thought should have accompanied his axiomatic systems to describe their intended interpretations. On the other hand
a rationale for abandoning spatial intuition in the axiomatic development of geometry is provided in the introduction
to the 1898-1899 lecture course (Hallett and Majer 2004, pp. 221-223) on which (1899) is most closely based.
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passage provides a summary of Hilbert’s conclusions in this regard:26
The final result then is: nowhere is the infinite realized; it is neither present in nature nor admissible
as a foundation in our rational thinking – a remarkable harmony between being and thought. We gain
a conviction that runs counter to the earlier endeavors of Frege and Dedekind, the conviction that, if
scientific knowledge is to be possible, certain intuitive conceptions and insights are indispensable; logic
alone does not suffice. The right to operate with the infinite can be secured only by means of the finite.
(1925, p. 392)
Hilbert reaches this conclusion after recording a long list of examples which testify to the central role
played by infinitary concepts and structures in contemporary mathematics. In the case of geometry
he observes both that the Euclidean axioms lead to the assumption that space is infinite and also
that introduction of ‘ideal elements’ (e.g. points at infinity) makes the axiomatization of geometry
‘as simple and perspicuous as possible’ (p. 373). But he also observes that current physical theory
leaves open that physical space is bounded in extent before concluding that ‘Euclidean geometry,
as a structure and a system of notions, is consistent in itself, but this does not imply that it applies
to reality’ (pp. 371-372). Such considerations are at least suggestive of why Hilbert may have
originally demurred from offering a synthetic characterization of axiom systems like HP which do
not have finite models. But they also give rise to the question of whether by the mid-1920s he
could have continued to endorse the slogan ‘consistency implies existence’ while also allowing that
a theory could be ‘consistent in itself’ while failing to possess a model ‘in reality’?
Bernays’s awareness of this issue is also vividly attested in the following note he made at around
this time:27
The claim: “Existence = consistency” can only refer to a system as a whole. Within an axiomatic
system the axioms decide about the existence of objects. ¶ If, for a system as a whole, consistency is
to be synonymous with existence, then the proof of consistency must consist in an exhibition. ¶ (All
consistency proofs up to now have been either direct exhibitions or indirect ones by reduction; in the
latter case a certain other system is already taken as existent. – Frege has defended with particular
emphasis the view that any proof of consistency has to be given by the actual presentation of a system
of objects). ¶ In proof theory, laying a new foundation of arithmetic, consistency proofs are not given
by exhibition. From this foundational standpoint it does not hold any longer that existence equals
consistency. Indeed, it is not the opinion that the possibility of an infinite system is to be proved,
rather it is only to be shown that operating with such a system does not lead to contradictions in
mathematical reasoning.
As should now be evident, the tenability of the restrictive view about mathematical existence
described here is at least called into question by Gödel’s Completeness Theorem. But as the
26A related passage from the first volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik (1934, pp. 15-16) is as follows: ‘In view
of this difficulty in proving consistency, we could now try to use some other infinite domain of individuals which is not
a mere product of thought (such as the number series), but is taken from the realm of sense perception or physical
reality. If we take a closer look, however, we realize that wherever we believe that we encounter infinite manifolds
in the realm of qualia or in physical reality, there can be no actual detection of such a manifold. The conviction
of the existence of such a manifold actually rests on a mental extrapolation, which requires an examination of its
justification at least, as necessarily as the conception of the totality of the number series.’
27This is part of a note found in Hilbert’s Nachlass in Göttingen [Cod. 685:9, 2] with the title ‘Existenz und
Widerspruchsfreiheit’. It has been reproduced in the original and in translation by Sieg (2002, p. 479) who dates it
to between 1925 and 1928.
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foregoing passages also make clear, Hilbert and Bernays were at this time operating from within
a framework which took as central the interaction between epistemological concerns about how we
can come to know that various theories are consistent and ontological ones about what it would
mean for a satisfying model to exist in the case that they are. It is striking how far removed
these considerations are from the concerns and presuppositions of contemporary model theory. For
in contemporary practice doubts about the consistency of theories or the ontological status of the
models largely given way to the goal of applying specific model theoretic techniques – e.g. quantifier
elimination, omitting types, infinitary logic – to study questions internal to specific branches of
infinitary mathematics.28
But as we shall see in §4 and §5, the legacy of Hilbert and Bernays’s work in mathematical
logic is more directly related to the development of computability theory than it is to model theory
in the manner in which these subjects are now understood. In addition to Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems, some of the early work in this area is already taken into account in the second volume of
Grundlagen der Mathematik. This contains a novel result of Bernays which has come to be called
the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. A simple formulation of this result is as follows:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Γ is a finite set of sentences over an arbitrary first order language LΓ
and that Γ is consistent – i.e. Γ 6⊢ ⊥. Then Γ is model-theoretically interpretable in the standard
model of first-order arithmetic – i.e. the L1
Z
-structure N = 〈N,+,×, <, 0〉.
Suppose we now officially define an arithmetical model for a first-order language LΓ – which, for
ease of illustration, we assume contains only predicate letters P1, . . . , Pk – to be a structure M =
〈A,R1, . . . , Rn〉 such that A ⊆ N, Ri ⊆ Nri (where ri is the arity of Pi) and also that each of
these sets is arithmetically definable – i.e. there exists L1
Z
-formulas δ(x), ψ1(~x), . . . , ψn(x) such that
A = {n ∈ N : N |= δ(n)} and Ri = {~n ∈ Nri : N |= ψi(~n)}. Theorem 3.1 is then equivalent to the
statement: Every finite consistent set of first-order sentences Γ has an arithmetical model.
Theorem 3.1 is, of course, a version of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem – i.e. every consistent
set of sentences Γ over a countable language has a countable model. Gödel’s (1929) original proof
of completeness established this directly by constructing a model M |= Γ which has either domain
N (in the case that Γ has at least one infinite model) or otherwise has a domain consisting of
finitely many equivalence classes over N (in the case that Γ has only finite models). Bernays’s result
strengthens this observation by showing how Gödel’s method can be formalized in a manner which
allows for the construction of arithmetical formulas defining the non-logical symbols in LΓ so that
the resulting collection of arithmetical sets forms a model of Γ. In §5 I will return to the question of
whether this construction can additionally be viewed as yielding a finitary reduction of the problem
posed by case 5ii) – e.g. in that of proving the consistency of theories which can be shown to possess
no finite models.
4 On the difficulty of consistency
In the prior two sections I have laid out a case for the first of my initial theses (2i) – i.e. that Gödel’s
Completeness Theorem was not only obtained in light of the concerns brought to the fore by the
Frege-Hilbert controversy but that these considerations also contributed to its subsequent reception.
In this section, I will present a case for thesis (2ii) – i.e. that Frege was correct to anticipate that
28The extent of this transformation is aptly illustrated by Baldwin (2018) via the applications of work in stability
and classification theory to algebraic geometry and combinatorics.
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there is a precise sense in which the problem of determining the consistency of a set of sentences (so
that, e.g., completeness might be applied) is as difficult as it can be. Laying this out will require
indicating an analysis of what it means for a mathematical problem to be difficult – an account I
will also employ in §5 to provide an account of the relative ease of demonstrating existence given
consistency. Although the proposal I will present is general, it will still be useful to approach it via
the historical frame of the preceding sections.29
A first consideration emerges from Frege’s original misgivings about Hilbert’s goal of obtaining
a ‘direct’ consistency proof for arithmetic or analysis. We have seen that Hilbert stated this goal
in (1900a) but provided few details as to the form which such a proof might take. Although
this announcement itself played a role at the end of his correspondence with Hilbert, Frege also
commented extensively on the nature and role of consistency proofs in both his mathematical and
philosophical work. I will now suggest that these accounts collectively suggest that he identified
two dimensions of difficulty involved in such proofs.
The first dimension can be introduced by recalling that a central part in Frege’s own philosophy
of mathematics was played by what we would now call conceptual analysis. In fact a key feature
of his logicism was the denial of the view that the surface grammar of textbook statements of
mathematical theorems and other principles provide a reliable guide to the non-logical primitives
which should appear in a fundamental axiomatization of their subject matter. He rather held that
the notions expressed by grammatically simple expressions employed in practice are often amenable
to a form of analysis which reveals that they admit to decomposition into more elementary concepts.
Such a process was to be repeated, potentially uncovering multiple conceptual strata which – to
suit Frege’s ends – ought to be of an increasingly logical character.
Frege famously applied this method to arithmetic in the program he announced in his Begriff-
sschrift (1879) and then developed more fully in his Grundlagen (1884) and the two volumes of his
Grundgesetze (1893, 1903). The details and exigencies of Frege’s proposed analysis of number theo-
retic statements in terms of equicardinality and the analysis of the latter in terms of the extensions
of concepts are sufficiently well known that there is no need to enter into them here.30 As Frege’s
general views about content evolved over time, it is not easy to give a concise account of the cir-
cumstances under which he would have regarded a proposed analysis as preserving the proposition
(or thought) expressed by a sentence. But what is most significant here is that he maintained the
centrality of conceptual analysis throughout the evolution of his program and also that he proposed
this method should be applied not just to arithmetical discourse but that of other sciences as well.
Both points are evident from the following passage from his late paper ‘Logic in mathematics’:
29Although informal attributions of ‘ease’ and ‘difficulty’ are common in mathematical practice, philosophers have
thus far paid little attention to their basis or the formal judgement or their relationship to notions such as hardness,
completeness, or degree of difficulty (or unsolvability) studied in subjects such as computability theory and complexity
theory. The account developed here should be understood as exemplifying how the notion of problem difficulty from
(Dean 2019b) – i.e. that of deciding an infinite class of yes-no questions about set membership – relates to that of
propositional difficulty – i.e. that of determining the truth or falsity of a single mathematical statement.
30For present purposes an equally illustrative example is provided by Frege’s (1880, pp. 27-32) proposal to
demonstrate the statement ‘the sum of two multiples of a number is in its turn a multiple of that number’ – i.e.
∀w∀x∀y∃z(w×x+w×y = z·w) – from axioms stating the associativity of addition – i.e. ∀x∀y∀z((x+y)+z = x+(y+z))
– and that 0 is the additive identity – i.e. ∀x(x = x + 0). Frege argues that it is possible to derive this statement
without ‘presupposing any multiplication theorem’ or even ‘the concept of multiplication’ by analyzing the con-
cept expressed by ‘multiple of’ in terms of that expressed by ‘x is a multiple of y iff x appears in the sequence
0, y, y + y, (y + y) + y, . . .’ This analysis can potentially be further decomposed using the notion of ‘hereditary in the
f -sequence’ which Frege attempts to characterize logically in §III of his Begriffsschrift. See (Blanchette 2012, §1) for
further reconstruction of this example.
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In the development of a science it can indeed happen that one has used a word, a sign, an expression,
over a long period under the impression that its sense is simple until one succeeds in analysing it into
simpler logical constituents. By means of such an analysis, we may hope to reduce the number of
axioms; for it may not be possible to prove a truth containing a complex constituent so long as that
constituent remains unanalysed; but it may be possible, given an analysis, to prove it from truths in
which the elements of the analysis occur. (1914, p. 209)
Understood in the context of this passage, Frege’s remark in his initial letter to Hilbert that he
had earlier considered an axiomatization of geometry in which he could ‘make do with fewer primitive
terms’ [IV/3, p. 34] comes into sharper focus. For it highlights that if the non-logical expressions
of the language LH of Hilbert’s theories are subjected to further analysis then his consistency and
independence proofs might be invalidated in virtue of the discovery that a previously independent
statement becomes provable or refutable once the notions needed to formulate it properly have been
subjected to conceptual analysis.31 In voicing such concerns, Frege isolates the following question
illustrating the first of the two dimensions of difficulty alluded to above:32
(D1) Suppose we are given a set of sentences Γ formulated over a language LΓ and a definition of
formal derivability from axioms Γ ⊢ ϕ. Let Γ∗ denote the thoughts expressed by the sentences
in Γ. How can we determine if the LΓ-formulation of the thoughts in Γ∗ provides an adequate
analysis of the concepts (or senses) which they contain so that the formal consistency of Γ
(i.e. Γ 6⊢ ⊥) provides a sufficient condition for the consistency of the thoughts Γ∗?
It is easy to adduce examples which illustrate that this is not a mathematically idle concern.33
But as Frege himself admitted, it is at best unclear whether (D1) admits to a definitive answer
even in specific cases. For not only are we left with the question of when a proposed conceptual
analysis of an expression is correct, but there is also the question of whether there is a means of
determining whether we have reached an ‘ultimate’ strata of concepts beneath which no further
analysis is possible. And in both cases, it seems that Frege simply did not provide an answer.34
31In fact Frege (1914, p. 247) provides the expected case in point by considering the possibility that the Parallel
Postulate becomes derivable if additional relationships between the concepts expressed by ‘straight line’, ‘parallel’,
and ‘intersect’ are taken into account by the geometric axioms.
32This formulation presupposes that consistency is a notion which is appropriately applied to sets of propositions
in addition to their expressions as sentences in a fixed language. Although Frege most often speaks of consistency
of concepts specified by sets of defining predicates, it seems likely that he would not have objected to these other
formulations. But of course it is also possible to formulate a question similar to (D1) where we ask not after the
consistency of the set of propositions Γ∗ but rather after that of a set of sentences Γ+ which is obtained from Γ by
systematically replacing the non-logical terms of LΓ with expressions in LΓ+ which provide linguistic formulations
of appropriate conceptual analyses. Such a characterization takes a step towards reformulating (D1) in a manner
which could potentially be assimilated to the second dimension of difficulty (D2) discussed below – e.g. by asking
after how hard it is to determine whether there exists a proof-theoretic interpretation of Γ in a theory Γ+ satisfying
various adequacy conditions on successful conceptual analyses. A related proposal is given by Eder (2015) in his
reconstruction of Frege’s unpublished (1906) attempt to understand Hilbert’s independence proofs on his own terms.
33In fact a paradigm example is provided by Tarski’s (1959) later axiomatization of geometry in a language which
contains only a sort for points and equidistance and betweenness predicates. Not only might such an axiomatization
be regarded as simpler than Hilbert’s but it also has different metatheoretic properties – e.g. Tarski’s theory is unlike
HP in that it is deductively complete and hence decidable (as I will discuss in §6). But as has been stressed by Kreisel
(1967), it is also possible to look at subsequent debates about set theoretic independence through the lens of (D1) –
e.g. can further application of conceptual analysis (or ‘informal rigour’) to the concepts set and membership be used
to justify axioms which decide formally independent statements such as the Continuum Hypothesis?
34See, e.g., (1914, p. 209 ff.). But of course this issue is yet more complex since it interfaces in various ways with
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The foregoing observations about Frege’s outlook on consistency proofs are well-known. But it is
evident that Frege additionally anticipated another central difficulty about the notion of consistency
which – while itself well-known – admits to a precise mathematical analysis while also engaging with
his misgivings about the possibility of non-model-theoretic consistency proofs. This dimension can
be introduced by observing that in the course of highlighting (D1), Frege also called attention to the
fact that even at a fixed level of analysis the problem of checking consistency is often non-trivial.
One of his formulations of this point is as follows:
It is completely wrongheaded to imagine that every contradiction is immediately recognizable; frequently
the contradiction lies deeply buried and is only discovered by a lengthy chain of inference.
(1906, p. 194/179)
The use of the metaphorical expression ‘deeply buried’ is typical of Frege’s remarks about the sort
of effort which is often required to provide revealing conceptual analyses. But he also acknowledged
that the process of analyzing concepts is itself distinct from that of deductively deriving consequences
from their formulations within a fixed theory.35 In using expressions such as ‘lengthy chain of
inference’ it would thus appear that Frege is pointing to another aspect of what often makes it
difficult to determine if a given set of sentences is consistent. One way of formulating the question
underlying this second dimension is as follows:
(D2) Let Γ be a fixed set of sentences and Γ ⊢ ϕ a notion of deductive consequence as above. Given
that formal derivations can be of unbounded length – and thus there is no a priori bound
which can be placed on the length of the derivation of a contradiction – how can we decide if
Γ 6⊢ ⊥?
It is again easy to adduce examples which illustrate that this is not a mathematically idle
concern.36 But note that in the case where Γ is a finite set of first-order sentences, it is also
straightforward to see that (D2) is equivalent to Hilbert and Ackermann’s Entscheidungsproblem –
i.e. to the question of determining in the general case whether ϕ is derivable from Γ. For in this
case we then have following sequence of biequivalences:
(7) Γ ⊢ ϕ iff Γ ⊢ ¬¬ϕ iff Γ ⊢ ¬ϕ→ ⊥ iff Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} ⊢ ⊥
Thus if we possessed a general method for determining if an arbitrary finite set of first-order sentences
is consistent, then we could also use this method to decide if Γ ⊢ ϕ by determining whether it yields
a negative answer when applied to Γ ∪ {¬ϕ}.
Frege’s views about other difficult topics – e.g. the composition of thoughts as sense complexes, the identity of sense,
and the role of definitions in mathematics. See, e.g., (Blanchette 2012, §2).
35E.g. ‘The effect of the logical analysis of which we spoke will then be precisely this – to articulate the sense
clearly. Work of this kind is very useful; it does not, however, form part of the construction of the system, but must
take place beforehand.’ (1914, p. 211)
36Frege made the prior remark as part of a reaction to Shoenflies’s discussion of Russell’s paradox – a contradiction
which had famously afflicted the system of his Grundgesetze. But although we now do not think of this contradiction
as ‘lying deeply buried’ itself, the history of mathematical logic provides other examples where axiom systems have
been found to be inconsistent only in virtue of lengthy (and sometimes non-obvious) derivations. For instance, Curry
(1941) observed that the complete derivation of a contradiction discovered by Kleene and Rosser in one of Church’s
original formulations of the lambda calculus runs to 162 published pages. (In fact it was in an effort to simplify this
result by which Curry (1942) was led to what we now call ‘Curry’s paradox’.) Rosser (1942) similarly showed that the
system in the first edition of Quine’s Mathemtaical Logic was inconsistent by presenting a dense 15-page derivation
of the Burali-Forti paradox. But of course the true force of (D2) is best illustrated by the existence of axiom systems
whose consistency is still taken to be an open problem – e.g. ZF plus the existence of a Reinhardt cardinal or Quine’s
New Foundations (Holmes’s recently claimed consistency proof remaining as yet unpublished).
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Although Frege’s reservations about Hilbert’s consistency proofs are traditionally explained in
terms of his preoccupation with (D1), the previous passage suggests that he was also well aware of
the challenge posed by (D2). Additional evidence to this effect is provided by his more extensive
discussion of consistency proofs in the second volume of his Grundgesetze. Therein we find the
following highly germane passage:
How is it to be recognised that properties do not contradict each other? There seems to be no other
criterion than to find the properties in question in one and the same object . . .¶ . . . Or is there perhaps
a different way to prove the freedom from contradiction? If there were, this would be of the highest
significance for all mathematicians who ascribe the power of creation to themselves. And yet hardly
anyone seems concerned to find such a method of proof. Why not? Probably because of the view that
it is superfluous to prove freedom from contradiction since any contradiction would surely be noticed
immediately. How nice if it were so! How easy all proofs would then be! The proof of the Pythagorean
theorem would then go as follows:
“Assume the square of the hypotenuse is not of equal area with the squares of the two other
sides taken together; then there would be a contradiction between this assumption and
the familiar axioms of geometry. Therefore, our assumption is false, and the square of the
hypotenuse is of an area exactly equal to the squares of the two other sides taken together.”
. . . Absolutely any proof could be conducted following this pattern. Unfortunately, the method is too
easy to be acceptable. Surely, we see that not every contradiction lies in plain view. Moreover, we
lack a sure criterion for the cases where from the non-obviousness of a contradiction we may infer its
absence. (Frege 1903, §143-§144)
Like Hilbert (1900a), Frege begins here by calling attention to the fact that consistency proofs
have traditionally proceeded by exhibiting models. But rather than taking this as an incentive to
develop a new technique for proving consistency which avoid this exigency, Frege then appears to
offer a reductio of the supposition that such a method might exist.37 One way of reconstructing his
argument is as follows:
(8) i) Suppose there were a mathematical method which allowed us to determine whether an
arbitrary set of sentences Γ is consistent without exhibiting a satisfying model – i.e. an
effective procedure α which when applied to a specification of Γ allowed us to determine
if Γ 6⊢ ⊥ in a finite number of steps, taking into account both that no general bound can
be placed on the length of a proof of a contradiction and also that Γ may not possess a
finite model which would rule out the existence of such a proof.
ii) In virtue of (7), the general task of deciding if an arbitrary mathematical sentence ϕ
follows Γ could then be replaced by using α to decide if Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
iii) In practice, we find that the task of deciding whether a statement follows from a set of
axioms is of considerable difficulty – e.g. while we know that the Pythagorean Theorem
is derivable from the axioms HP, this is only so in virtue of the fact that we have
expended effort in finding a proof, not as a result of applying a general algorithmic
decision procedure.38
37Frege, p. 237 also writes that ‘In my conceptual notation inference is conducted like a calculation . . . in the sense
that there is an algorithm . . . which govern[s] the transition from one sentence or from two sentences to a new one in
such a way that nothing happens except in conformity with the rules’. The issue he is addressing in the prior passage
is thus not whether the step-by-step process of derivation is effective, but rather that of whether there is a general
algorithmic method for determining whether a statement is derivable from axioms by a proof of arbitrary length.
38In the passage cited above, Frege offers both the Pythagorean Theorem and the Law of Quadratic Reciprocity
21
iv) The existence of α as described in i) would thus trivialize a problem which we know to
be difficult in practice. We can thus conclude that no such method can exist.
An obvious rejoinder to this argument is that our ignorance of a general method for deciding
consistency – however well confirmed in mathematical practice – is not itself sufficient to conclude
that no such method can exist. But in juxtaposing these concerns, Frege can also be seen as
anticipating by more than 30 years another well-known turn of events in mathematical logic. For
as we now know, Church and Turing answered the Entscheidungsproblem in the negative in 1936.
Relative to the widely accepted analysis of ‘effective procedure’ as ‘Turing computable function’ (to
which I will return in a moment), Frege was thus indeed prescient in suspecting that no general
method for checking the consistency of finite sets of fist-order sentences can exist.
This is often presented as a negative (or “limitative”) result. But it may also be contrasted
with several positive results pertaining to special cases of the Entscheidungsproblem and to ‘direct’
consistency proofs which had previously been obtained by Hilbert and his collaborators. By the
1920s, Hilbert had come to realize that a first step towards a positive characterization of this notion
already follows from the introduction of a formal definition of derivability – i.e. what has been
denoted here by Γ ⊢ ϕ. For in the course of defining such a relation, one also defines a class of
derivations Der whose members D0,D1, . . . are what we typically call ‘proofs’ – e.g. in the case of
‘Hilbert proofs’ for first-order logic as defined by Hilbert and Ackermann (1928) a finite sequence of
formulas whose elements are either members of Γ, logical axioms, or follow from earlier statements
by rules such as modus ponens.
Once such a definition of derivability is in place, the definition of the consistency of Γ then takes
the form
(9) Γ 6⊢ ⊥ if and only if for all D ∈ Der, it is not the case that D has hypotheses contained in Γ
and conclusion ⊥.
Hilbert repeatedly called attention to the fact that the structure of this definition makes clear
that to prove the consistency of Γ it suffices to demonstrate a universal assertion about finite
combinatorial objects (i.e. proofs) rather than an existential one about the existence of a (possibly
infinite) satisfying model.39 And on this understanding, he and his collaborators did in fact make
a considerable amount of progress in the 1920s and early 1930s towards the development of what
can be regarded as direct methods of proving consistency.
The methods in question are typified by the technique of cut elimination which pertains to
an alternative proof system for first-order logic known as the sequent calculus originally due to
from number theory as examples of this phenomena. Although there are many well-known proofs of both statements,
they are each typically taken to be at least somewhat involved or non-obvious in their respective domains. They both
can thus both be taken to illustrate instances in which what Detlefsen (1990, p. 376) calls the inventional complexity
of a statement – i.e. that ‘encountered in coming up with a proof in the first place’ – would be trivialized if there
were a general method for proving consistency of the sort which Frege considers.
39E.g. ‘To prove consistency we therefore need only show that 0 6= 0 cannot be obtained from our axioms by the
rules in force as the end formula of a proof, hence that 0 6= 0 is not a provable formula. And this is a task that
fundamentally lies within the province of intuition just as much as does in contentual number theory the task, say,
of proving the irrationality of
√
2, that is, of proving that it is impossible to find two numerals a and b satisfying
the relation a2 = 2b2, a problem in which it must be shown that it is impossible to exhibit two numerals having a
certain property. Correspondingly, the point for us is to show that it is impossible to exhibit a proof of a certain
kind.’ (1927, p. 471)
22
Gerhard Gentzen.40 Gentzen showed in his dissertation (written under Bernays) that there existed
an effective procedure γ whereby applications of the so-called cut rule (a generalized form of modus
ponens) can be successively eliminated such that a derivation D of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ can be
transformed into a so-called cut-free derivation γ(D) = D∗ of the same sequent. Cut-free derivations
D∗ can also be shown to possess the so-called subformula property – i.e. if D∗ is a cut-free derivation
of Γ ⇒ ∆, then all of the formulas it contains are subformulas of formulas appearing in either Γ
or ∆ (a feature which is potentially violated by the cut rule). A consequence is that the sequent
∅ ⇒ ∅ is not derivable in Gentzen’s system which, on the intended interpretation, corresponds to
the non-derivability of a contradiction from no premises. In this way cut elimination yields another
proof of the consistency of pure first-order logic (i.e. 6⊢ ⊥) which can be contrasted with Hilbert &
Ackermann’s inductive consistency proof using arithmetical models.
Such a proof can be carried out either by directly reasoning about derivations as finite combi-
natorial objects or via a well-known formalization within in a fragment of PRA.41 In both cases the
sort of reasoning involved is paradigmatically finitary in the sense described by Hilbert and Bernays
(1934) – e.g. not only can the cut elimination operation γ be understood as acting on ‘concrete’
(or ‘intuitively accessible’) proofs, proving that it has the requisite properties does not require rea-
soning involving unbounded quantifiers over the natural numbers. In this way Gentzen’s method
is prototypical of the sorts of positive results which Hilbert hoped would ultimately be capable of
supplying a consistency proof for analysis.42
As mathematical axioms typically disturb the symmetric nature of the logical rules on which
Gentzen’s method depends, the foregoing method on its own is not sufficient to demonstrate the
consistency of substantial fragments of analysis or even arithmetic.43 These difficulties notwith-
standing, I will describe below how traditional proof-theoretic techniques can be combined with
more recent methods from Reverse Mathematics to prove the consistency of the specific geometric
theories with which Hilbert was concerned in (1899) in a manner which is arguably ‘direct’.44 Al-
though Hilbert could not have cited such results at the time of his correspondence with Frege, I will
also suggest that this does indeed bear retrospectively on how we should understand some aspects of
their disagreement with respect to geometry. But we have also seen how their exchange led them to
individually recognize the dimension of difficulty embodied by (D2) as well as its relevance to geo-
metric consistency proofs – in Frege’s case by using it to argue that no non-model-theoretic method
40As a means for proving consistency, cut elimination is related to (but arguably more general than) the slightly
earlier methods of ε-substitution – i.e. Hilbert’s Ansatz (1923) – and also that of expansion or réduite – i.e. Herbrand’s
Theorem (1930). These techniques are connected in such a way that most of the general points made below about
‘direct consistency proofs’ could be formulated in terms of each of them. See, e.g., (Rathjen and Sieg 2018) for an
overview of their technical and historical relationship.
41See, e.g., (Hájek and Pudlák 1998, §3c, §5d).
42Hilbert’s remarks on Ackermann’s attempted consistency proof (1927, pp. 477-479) via the ε-substitution method
are prototypical here. But the context is complicated by the fact that once Ackermann’s subsequent modifications to
the proof are take into account, the scope of his result is more limited than Hilbert appears to have assumed. See,
e.g., the introduction to Bernays’s commentary on (1927) in (van Heijenoort 1967, p. 485-486).
43This obstacle can be overcome in certain cases by the techniques of partial cut elimination or ordinal analysis
(as introduced by Gentzen in his 1936 consistency proof for first-order arithmetic). However these methods are most
directly applicable to theories in which arithmetic and are thus only indirectly relevant here.
44Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem also places well-known constraints on the relationship between Γ and a
theory T in which a potential consistency proof can be formalized. But note that this is only a concern when both Γ
is ‘stronger’ than T (in the sense of interpretability) and the consistency of T is itself in doubt. And as I will discuss
further in §5, these conditions are not satisfied in the specific case when T can be taken to be PRA and Γ is one of
Hilbert’s geometric theories.
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of showing consistency could exist and in Hilbert’s case by explicitly formulating the decidability of
first-order logic as an open mathematical question (see also note 16).
Partial solutions to special cases of the Entscheidungsproblem for a fragment of first-order logic
were in fact obtained by Bernays and Schönfinkel (1928). However two other well-known develop-
ments separate the context in which the problem was originally framed – wherein Hilbert clearly
appears to have expected a positive solution – from that in which Church (1936) and Turing (1936)
showed that no general finitary decision procedure for first-order logic can exist. First, Church and
Turing were able to rely on their independently motivated analyses of the notion ‘finite decision
procedure’ – respectively in the form of their definitions of λ-definability and computability by a
Turing machine. And second, in order to provide a uniform analysis of decidability for different
domains, they were also able to make use of Gödel’s (1931) arithmetization of syntax so as to
formulate the Entscheidungsproblem as a decision problem about numbers rather than formulas.
These developments are also sufficiently familiar to require little comment. But to fix the
aspects which will be relevant here, recall that Gödel’s method allows us to define a mapping
p·q : Form→ N which effectively assigns a numerical code pϕq (or Gödel number) to every sentence
ϕ in the class Form of well-formed first-order formulas. This in turn allows us to define the set
Val = {pϕq : ϕ is a valid first-order formula} ⊆ N and also its characteristic function val(n) which
returns the value 1 just in case n = pϕq if ϕ ∈ Val and 0 otherwise. The relevant form of the result
proven by Church and Turing can now be formulated as follows:45
Theorem 4.1. val(x) is neither a λ-definable function nor a Turing computable function.
Church and Turing also supplied arguments for the adequacy of their models by providing what
can reasonably be called conceptual analyses of the notion ‘effectively computable function’. Taken
together with results demonstrating the extensional coincidence of the Turing computable and λ-
definable functions (as well as those determined by several other models), these are now generally
taken to confirm Church’s Thesis – i.e. the claim that the Turing computable (and thus also λ-
definable, etc.) functions coincide with those which are effectively computable by a finite procedure.
But Turing in fact showed a bit more than this which is relevant to how we might understand
(D2). For in the course of proving Theorem 4.1 he demonstrated the following:
(10) For every Turing machine T and input n ∈ N, it is possible to effectively construct a
first-order formula ϕT,n such that T (n) ↓ – i.e. the computation of T on n halts – if and only
if ⊢ ϕT,n – i.e. ϕT,n is provable in Hilbert & Ackermann’s axiomatization of first-order logic.
Suppose we now let T0, T1, . . . be an effective enumeration of Turing machines – say in increasing
order of their Gödel numbers – and also define the sets H = {〈i, x〉 : Ti(x) ↓} – i.e. the Halt-
ing Problem consisting of pairs of indices and inputs to Halting Turing machine computations –
andProv = {pϕq : ⊢ ϕ & ϕ ∈ Form} – i.e. the set of (codes of) provable first-order formulas.
Note also that it follows from the Soundness and Completeness Theorems for first-order logic that
Prov = Val. Thus in proving (10) Turing (1936, pp. 259-263) also demonstrated the following:
(11) There exists a Turing computable function f such that for all Turing machines Ti and inputs
x, 〈i, x〉 ∈ H if and only if f(i, x) ∈ Val.
45See, e.g., (Soare 2016) or (Dean 2020) for a review of the notions from computability theory employed below
and (Börger et al. 2001) for both a modern presentation of results (10)-(13) and historical discussion of the decision
problem in a broader context.
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What (11) reports is that the Halting Problem for Turing machines is reducible to the problem
of deciding first-order validity – i.e. if there were an effective method for solving the Entschei-
dungsproblem, then this method could also be employed to solve Turing’s Halting Problem.
It is, of course, also a commonplace that H is itself a difficult problem in the sense that Turing
showed that it is not solvable by an algorithm (assuming Church’s Thesis). But although I have thus
far employed the term ‘difficult’ informally, Turing’s analysis was subsequently employed by Post
(1944) to define a general notion of a degree of difficulty (or unsolvability) which has subsequently
been studied in great detail within computability theory. For instance one way of understanding the
difficulty of H is to observe that it is a so-called Turing complete set – i.e. were we to have access to
a (notional) ‘oracle’ for deciding membership in H, then we could effectively decide membership in
every other computably enumerable set. But in order to relate the foregoing observations to (D2)
more directly, it will be useful to employ not this notion of a so-called Turing reduction but that of
a many-one reduction as exemplified by (11).
To this end, first observe that in addition to being Turing complete, the problem H can also be
shown to be a so-called Σ01-complete set. This means two things:
(12) i) H can be defined by a Σ01-formula of L
1
Z
– i.e. there is an open formula in the language
of first-order arithmetic of the form ψ(x) = ∃yχ(x, y) where χ(x, y) contains only
bounded quantifiers such that H = {n : N |= ψ(n)}.
ii) Every set A ⊆ N which is similarly definable by a Σ01-formula is many-one reducible to
H (notation: A ≤m H) in the sense exemplified by (11) – i.e. there is a Turing
computable function f(x) such that for x ∈ A if and only if f(x) ∈ H for all x ∈ N.
Next note that although the validity of ϕ is defined in terms of truth with respect to all models,
the extensional equivalence of the set Val with Prov also shows that the former set possesses an
existential (i.e. Σ01) definition – i.e. Val = {pϕq : N |= ∃yProofFOL(pϕq, y)} where ProofFOL(x, y)
is a variant of Gödel’s well-known proof predicate restricted to derivability in pure first-order logic.
Putting this together with the Σ01-completeness of H and the transitivity of the relation ≤m, this
shows that Val is also a Σ01-complete set.
As a final step towards relating these observations to (D2), consider the set Con = {pϕq : 6⊢
¬ϕ & ϕ ∈ Form} – i.e. the set of sentences which are consistent with the axioms of first-order logic
in the sense that their negations are not provable. It then follows that pϕq ∈ Con if and only if
p¬ϕq 6∈ Val – i.e. a first-order formula is consistent just in case its negation is not a valid formula.
It thus follows from this that Con is what is known as a Π01-complete set – i.e.
(13) i) Con is definable by a Π01-formula of the form θ(x) = ∀yη(x, y) where η(x, y) contains
only bounded quantifiers – in fact Con = {pϕq : N |= ∀y¬ProofFOL(p¬ϕq, y)}.
ii) Every set B ⊆ N which is similarly definable by a Π01-formula is many-one reducible to
Con – i.e. B ≤m Con.
The problem of deciding membership in Con is thus an arithmetized version of the original
question of checking the consistency of a finite set of axioms Γ. We have seen that Hilbert stressed
that the logical form of an assertion of consistency has a universal structure (9) which, via arithme-
tization, is parallel to that of (13i). But in addition to this, the Π01-hardness of Con (as reported by
13ii) shows that the problem of deciding n ∈ A for any Π01-definable set A can be uniformly reduced
to that of deciding whether a particular first-order formula ϕn,A is consistent with the axioms of
first-order logic.
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The significance of this can be further reinforced by observing that the Π01-definable sets include
TrΠ0
1
= {pϕq : ϕ is a Π01-formula of L
1
Z
and N |= ϕ} – i.e. set of all true Π01-statements about
the natural numbers. It thus follows that deciding not just the provability from specified axioms
but also the truth of any Π01-sentence about the natural numbers can be uniformly reduced to
checking the consistency of a single first-order formula. Many famous open problems in number
theory fall into this class – e.g. the Goldbach conjecture and the Riemann hypothesis. Given the
extensive efforts which have been mounted to prove these statements over the course of many years,
it does indeed seem implausible that there could exist a uniform procedure which allows us to
algorithmically determine their truth values. Thus even when Frege’s concerns about (D1) are set
aside, his expectations about the intrinsic difficulty of determining consistency are indeed confirmed
by the computability-theoretic analysis of the Entscheidungsproblem. For once the logical form of
consistency is taken into account, problem (D2) is indeed as difficult as it can be (per thesis 2ii).
5 On the ease of existence
The foregoing argument for thesis (2ii) makes use of concepts from computability theory to provide
an analysis of the difficulty of determining consistency in the sense of (D2). The notion of difficulty
which is at issue here is an epistemological one – i.e. it is evident that both Frege and Hilbert
had amongst their concerns the practical question of determining how we can come to know that
certain sets of axioms Γ are consistent. On the other hand thesis (2iii) – i.e. that Hilbert was
correct to maintain that demonstrating the existence of a model satisfying Γ is as easy as it can be
conditional on its consistency – has both epistemological and ontological dimensions. For assuming
Γ’s consistency, there is the question of gauging the difficulty of constructing a model of M |= Γ
and determining its properties. But there is also the question of what it means for such a structure
to exist in the first place.
A useful waypoint in navigating this relationship is Bernays’s (1950) paper ‘Mathematische
Existenz und Widerspruchsfreit’. Therein he makes the following remark about its titular concern:
The common acceptance of the explanation of mathematical existence in terms of consistency is no
doubt due in considerable part to the circumstance that on the basis of the simple cases one has in
mind, one forms an unduly simplistic idea of what consistency (compatibility) of conditions is. One
thinks of the compatibility of conditions as something the complex of conditions wears on its sleeve, as
it were, such that one need only sort out the content of the conditions clearly in order to see whether
they are in agreement or not. In fact, however, the role of the conditions is that they affect each other
in functional use and by combination. The result obtained in this way is not contained as a constitutent
part of what is given through the conditions. It is probably the erroneous idea of such inherence that
gave rise to the view of the tautological character of mathematical propositions. (p. 98)
This passage makes clear that Bernays was aware not only of the conceptual problem posed by
(D2) but also how the technical details pertaining to the Entscheidungsproblem bear on the Frege-
Hilbert controversy.46 But he here also suggests that although there may be a sense in which the
consistency of Γ does entail the existence of a satisfying model, he also observes that such a structure
need not be ‘contained as a constituent’ or ‘inherent’ within Γ itself. Much as Frege’s discussion of
consistency proofs anticipates the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem, I will suggest below
46By this point he had in fact offered a state-of-the-art account of the status of the decision problem for a number
of logical systems – inclusive of the results of Church and Turing – in (Hilbert and Bernays 1939, Sup. II).
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that Bernays’s remarks foreshadow several specific results which grew out of his own work on the
Arithmetized Completeness Theorem. But in order to appreciate this it will be useful to return
again to the problem of demonstrating the consistency of mathematical theories which can be shown
to possess no finite models.
As we have seen, one example of such a theory is provided by the conjunction of Hilbert’s
Incidence and Order axioms for geometry – i.e. I.1-8 and II.1-4 in (Hilbert 1971). Theorem 7 of
this edition states the following: ‘Between any two points on a line there exist an infinite number
of points.’ Since axiom II.1 requires the distinctness of points A,B,C standing in the betweenness
relation, this result can be obtained from Theorem 3 which states ‘For any two points A and C
there always exists at least one point D on the line AC that lies between A and C.’ This can
in turn be obtained by an argument which uses Axiom II.4 – a version of Pasch’s axiom which is
informally glossed as ‘If a line enters the interior of a triangle, it also leaves it’ – to construct D as
the intersection of AC and a line EG determined relative to another point F not incident on AC
whose existence is inferred by axiom I.3 – i.e. ‘There exist three points which do not lie on a line’.
In the first volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik (1934, pp. 5-6) Hilbert and Bernays illustrate
how it is possible to formalize this subset of Hilbert’s axioms in a one-sorted first-order language LG
containing predicates Gr(x, y, z) (for geraden) intended to express that x, y, z are collinear points
and Zw(x, y, z) (for zwischen) intended to express that x is between y and z. In particular, they
present nine sentences in this language {θ1, . . . , θ9} = Θ by which the axioms mentioned above can
be deduced and thus from which the formalization of Theorem 3 can also be derived in first-order
logic. It is then easy to see that the domain of any model M |= Θ must be infinite.
The foregoing situation thus presents a characteristic example of case 5ii) – i.e. a situation
in which we can prove mathematically that any model satisfying a given set of axioms must be
infinite (presuming one exists at all). As we have seen, Hilbert and Ackermann (1928) described
the problem of proving consistency in this case as ‘incomparably more difficult’ than that in which
a finite model can be exhibited. Hilbert and Bernays (1934) concretely illustrated this contrast by
first observing that a subset of Hilbert’s axioms which weakens II.4 is satisfied in a 5-element model
(p. 13). But they also note that it is easy to see that a theory of an irreflexive, transitive, and serial
relation can only have infinite models. And upon observing that that this theory is satisfied in the
structure 〈N, <〉, they conclude by remarking that this ‘exhibition does not conclusively settle the
issue of consistency’ but rather (again) ‘reduces it to the consistency of number theory’ (p. 15).
But as we are now in a better position to appreciate, this is at least potentially an overstatement.
For is at least possible that the axioms under consideration in this case are sufficiently weak that
their consistency can be demonstrated by a ‘direct’ consistency proof which be itself be formalized in
a suitably finitary theory of arithmetic. Bernays returned to this point immediately after his proof
of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem (1939, p. 253). He observes there that the question of
the consistency of a finitely axiomatizable theory Γ is reduced via arithmetization to the truth of
a particular Π01-statement Con(Γ) which can be defined as ∀x¬ProofFOL(x, p
∧
Γq).47 But in this
47Bernays constructed a Π01-formula expressing that ϕ is irrefutable by showing that there exists a primitive
recursive function q(x) such that the truth of ∀x(q(x) = 0) is equivalent to the non-derivability of ¬ϕ. But the
structure of q(x) is unlike the more familiar proof predicate employed by Gödel (1931) (and also here) in that it is
based not irrefutability in a Hilbert system but rather what we now call Herbrand consistency – i.e. the fact that the
so-called Herbrand expansions ϕn of ϕ are truth funcitonally satisfiable for all n (see, e.g., Hájek and Pudlák 1998,
§III.3c). Bernays’s presentation of Herbrand’s Theorem itself (1939, §III.3), suggests he understood this notion as an
intermediary between a syntactic definition of irrefutability and a semantic definition of satisfiability (on which see
also Franks 2009). Although the details cannot be considered further here, his proof of Theorem 5.2i (1939, §4.2) thus
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case the truth of Con(Γ) implies the existence of an arithmetical model of Γ in virtue of Theorem
3.1.
It is easy to see that the truth of Con(Γ) is equivalent to the membership of p
∧
Γq in the set
Con defined above. As we have seen that Con is a Π01-complete set, there can be no means of
effectively determining if Con(Γ) is a true arithmetical statement in the general case. On the other
hand, this does not preclude that in certain instances Con(Γ) can be proven in an appropriate
theory. And in this regard we can now record the following result which was promised in §4:48
Theorem 5.1. Let ∆ denote any of the sets of Hilbert’s geometric axioms considered in (4i,ii).
Then PRA ⊢ Con(∆).
It is reasonable to assume that Theorem 5.1 provides a demonstration that the systems con-
sidered in (5.1i,ii) are consistent which is ‘direct’ in the manner Hilbert came to understand this
term. Theorem 3.1 can thus be invoked to obtain arithmetical models of these theories in exactly
the manner which Bernays envisioned. For instance when applied to the theory Θ described above,
such a model will take the form of a structure T = 〈N, G, Z〉 |= Θ where N can be understood as the
domain of ‘points’ and G,Z ⊆ N3 are the extensions of the collinearity and betweenness predicates
Gr(x, y, z) and Zw(x, y, z) as defined by L1
Z
-formulas the γ(x, y, z) and ζ(x, y, z) whose existence is
yielded by Theorem 3.1.49
With an example of such a structure finally in hand, many of the original battle lines in the
Frege-Hilbert controversy may be revisited. For despite Frege’s specific misgivings, it is still possible
to view models like P or E described in §2 from the perspective of analytic geometry as consisting
of points in Euclidean space coordinatized by pairs of real numbers. But the fact that the ‘points’
of T are natural numbers is illustrative of how models obtained by Theorem 3.1 are even further
removed from spatial intuition. This is reinforced by observing that the extension of the predicate
ζ(x, y, z) which interprets the betweenness relation Zw in T may hold between a given triple of
natural numbers – say T |= Zw(42, 2, 17) and thus also N |= ζ(42, 2, 17) – despite the fact that the
numbers themselves are not between one another with respect to the less than relation on N – i.e.
appears to be connected in a deeper way to how Bernays viewed the relationship between consistency and existence.
48A proof-theoretic demonstration of a special case of this result using Hebrand’s Theorem is given by Beeson et al.
(2015). But as noted by Baldwin (2018, 10.3.4), Theorem 5.1 can be approached more uniformly from the standpoint
of Reverse Mathematics. A central observation in this regard is that systems like HP or HP + CCP whose models
are coordinatized by Pythagorean or Euclidean fields are also satisfied in so-called real closed fields (see §7). The
existence of the real closure Q˜ of Q – i.e. the ordered field of the real algebraic numbers – can be proven in the
subsystem of second-order arithmetic known as RCA0 consisting of IΣ1 plus comprehension for ∆
0
1-definable sets
(Simpson 2009, II.9.7). Reasoning in RCA0 it is then possible to computably construct models M |= ∆ over Q˜. Via
a formalized cut elimination argument, it is also possible to prove the formalization of the Soundness Theorem for
first-order logic in RCA0 (Simpson 2009, II.8.8) from which it thus follows that RCA0 ⊢ Con(∆). But since RCA0 is
conservative over PRA for Π02-statements (Simpson 2009, IX.1.11) – and as Con(∆) is a Π
0
1-statement – PRA proves
the consistency of ∆ as well.
49Hilbert and Bernays do not explicitly construct such a model of geometry themselves. On the other hand, at
the beginning of the second volume of Grundlagen der Mathematik they did anticipate Theorem 5.1 by showing how
the consistency of a geometrical theory similar to Θ can be proven using the First Epsilon Theorem (pp. 38-48).
Bernays (1954, pp. 88-94) would also go on to describe in detail how such a model could be constructed for the
set theoretic system GB− describe below. He would later go on to characterize such constructions as follows: ‘By
making the deductive structure of a formalized theory one’s object of study, as suggested by Hilbert, that theory is,
as it were, projected into number theory. The resulting number-theoretic structure is, in general, essentially different
from the structure intended by the theory; nevertheless, it can serve to recognize the consistency of the theory, from
a viewpoint that is more elementary than the assumption of the intended structure.’ (1970, p. 63). For more on the
nature and significance of such ‘projections’, see (Dean 2017) and (Sieg 2020, §3).
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N 6|= 2 < 42 < 17.50 One can thus envision Frege doubling down on his basic critique that since
Hilbert’s models reinterpret the geometric primitives in a manner which divorces them from their
intended meanings, Hilbert had no right to describe the reinterpreted statements as axioms and
thus also no justification for asserting that their deductive consequences express geometric truths.
But one of Hilbert’s best-known responses to Frege still seems apt:
But it is surely obvious that every theory is only a scaffolding or schema of concepts together
with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be thought of in
any way one likes. If in speaking of my points I think of some system of things, e.g. the system:
love, law, chimney sweep . . . and then assume all my axioms as relations between these things,
then my propositions, e.g. Pythagoras’ theorem, are also valid for these things. In other words:
any theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements. (IV/4, p. 42)
This passage has traditionally been taken to support the view that Hilbert regarded systems
of mathematical axioms as implicit definitions. But by the time of Grundlagen der Mathematik
he and Bernays had also come to systematically distinguish between what they called ‘formal ax-
iomatics’ and ‘contentual axiomatics’. The former applies to geometrical theories like Θ whose
consistency cannot be secured by exhibition and whose axioms thus not only lack ‘a special epis-
temic relation to [a] specific subject matter’ (p. 2) but also ‘transcend the realm of experience and
intuitive self-evidence’ (p. 3). In such cases, Hilbert and Bernays do explicitly endorse an implicit
interpretation:51
In formal axiomatics . . . the basic relations are not conceived to be contentually determined
from the outset; rather, they receive their determination only implicitly through the axioms.
And any considerations within an axiomatic theory may make use only of those aspects of the
basic relations that are explicitly formulated in the axioms. ¶ Thus, in axiomatic geometry,
whenever we use names that correspond to intuitive geometry – such as “lie on” or “lie between”
– this is just a concession to custom, and a means of simplifying the connection of the theory
with intuitive facts. Actually, however, in formal axiomatics, the basic relations play the role of
variable predicates. (1934, p. 7)
By contrast, Hilbert and Bernays describe contentual axiomatics as being grounded ‘in common
experience [which] presents its first principles either as self-evident facts or formulates them as
extracts from experience-complexes’ (p. 2). And it is precisely this sort of experience which they
took to ground elementary number theory about which they remark
In the field of arithmetic, we are not concerned with problematic issues connected with the
question of the specific character of geometrical knowledge; and it is indeed also here, in the
disciplines of elementary number theory and algebra, that we find the purest manifestation of
the standpoint of direct contentual thought that has evolved without axiomatic assumptions. ¶
This methodological standpoint is characterized by thought experiments with things that are
assumed to be concretely present, such as numbers in number theory . . . (1934, p. 20)
50This reflects the fact that the specific correlation between natural numbers and the points which one might take
to form a synthetic model S |= Θ is determined by largely unconstrained decisions about how the arithmetization
of syntax underlying Theorem 3.1 is carried out. Thus even when S is countable – in which case its points may be
put into one-to-one correspondence with N – T will be unlike P or E in the sense that it cannot (at least without
additional artifice) be regarded as arising from the coordinatization of a synthetic structure.
51See also (Bernays 1967, p. 497).
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After this they go on to describe in detail the contentual basis of primitive recursion and quantifier-
free induction in virtue of operations on numbers represented in stroke notation. This exposition
has traditionally been taken (e.g. by Tait 2005, §1-§2) to present the canonical justification for the
theory PRA from the finitary standpoint.
At least by the time of Grundlagen der Mathematik, Hilbert and Bernays may thus be under-
stood as having made a systematic distinction between ‘contentual axiomatics’ – as exemplified
by PRA – and ‘formal axiomatics’ – as exemplified by the theories of geometry, physics, analysis,
and set theory whose consistency they proposed to investigate using contentual theories. They also
held that this distinction was to be mirrored in how the theories are to be interpreted. For on the
one hand they regarded contentual theories as coming along with specific interpretations grounded
in intuition. But on the other hand, they thought of formal theories as lacking a specific subject
matter but potentially satisfiable by variable systems of objects and relations subject, of course, to
their consistency.
This in turn suggests the possibility of drawing a similar distinction about the nature of math-
ematical existence in the two cases. Bernays would go on to explore such a possibility in his later
philosophical writings. For instance in (1950) he suggests that it is still possible to regard the exis-
tential consequences of formal theories to justify assertions of what he refers to as ‘relative existence’
– e.g. if the existence of a model of Euclidean geometry is assumed, then we can understand the
consequences of theories like HP such as ‘there is a line connecting two given points’ to express a
true assertion of relative existence with respect to this model (p. 99).52 But when we ask after the
‘independent existence’ of such infinitary structures themselves, he suggests that we are led via a
familiar route to consider the theory of the mathematical continuum (i.e. analysis), and from there
to the number series via arithmetization. He finally asks
But where do all these reductions lead? We finally reach the point at which we make reference to a
theoretical framework [ideellen Rahmen]. It is a thought-system that involves a kind of methodological
attitude; in the final analysis, the mathematical existence posits [Existenz-Setzungen] relate to this
thought system . . . But we notice here again that we cannot simply identify existence with consistency,
for consistency applies to the framework as a whole, not to the individual thing being posited as existent.
(1950, p. 100)
Bernays does not explicitly identify what he takes such a framework to be. But he does remark
that mathematicians work within a basic set of assumptions about which there can be no ‘de facto
doubt’ and whose consistency serves as ‘the precondition for the validity of the existence posits made
within the theoretical framework’ (p. 441). This suggests that what he had in mind is indeed the
standpoint of contentual mathematics within which the proof-theoretic investigations undertaken in
Grundlagen der Mathematik are carried out. On the basis of this interpretation, I will now suggest
that the continued study of the Completeness Theorem allows us to further refine our understanding
of mathematical existence in regard to formal axiomatics.
To this end it will be useful to formulate the following extensions to Theorem 3.1:53
52Parsons (2014) – who describes ‘Mathematische Existenz und Widerspruchsfreit’ as ‘one of the most important
contributions to mathematical ontology of its time’ – also takes these remarks as evidence that Bernays held a
structuralist view about the nature of mathematical objects more generally. I will return to this possibility in §6.
53The proof of part i) of this theorem can be extracted from Bernays’s original proof of Theorem 3.1 for Z = PA
but is stated more explicitly by Feferman (1960). Part ii) is stated by Kleene (1952, p. 394) and builds on prior work
of Kreisel, Mostowski, and Hasenjager. Part iii) is implicit in (Feferman 1960) but explicitly stated (e.g.) in (Kaye
1991). See (Dean 2019a) for further reconstruction.
30
Theorem 5.2. Let T be an arbitrary computably axiomatizable theory, Con(T) its canonical con-
sistency statement formulated in L1
Z
and Z an L1
Z
-theory extending IΣ1. Then:
i) T is proof-theoretically interpretable in Z+Con(T).
ii) If T is consistent, then there exists an arithmetical model M |= T interpretable in N whose
atomic diagram is ∆02-definable.
iii) If T is consistent, then there exists an arithmetical model M |= T interpretable in N whose
elementary diagram is ∆02-definable.
Although this formulation takes advantage of several notions which were not available in the
1930s, the core parts of Theorem 5.2i were shown by Bernays in (1939) for finitely axiomatizable
theories. What is meant here by Con(T) is thus simply the extension of Bernays’s consistency
predicate Con(Γ) to the case of provability from a decidable (but not necessarily finite set) of
mathematical axioms T, a special case of which had already been employed by Gödel (1931). IΣ1
is a weak subsystem of first-order Peano arithmetic [PA] which limits the scope of the induction
axiom to Σ01-formulas. What Theorem 5.2i hence reports is that there is an interpretation (·)
∗ of the
language LT into the arithmetical language L1Z such that if T ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ
∗ is derivable in Z together
with the assumption of T’s consistency expressed formally as Con(T). Bernays demonstrated this
by showing how it is possible to formalize Gödel’s original completeness proof in a fragment of PA.
Although it is easy to show that this fragment can be taken to be IΣ2, it is more involved to
show that IΣ1 suffices. But once this step is undertaken, it is also possible to take advantage of a
well-known ‘proof theoretic reduction’ of IΣ1 to PRA to argue that Theorem 5.2i is accessible from
the finitary standpoint.54 But now consider the result of applying Theorem 5.2i to a theory such as
Θ. Since Z extends PRA we have that Z ⊢ Con(Θ) by Theorem 5.1 and thus also
(14) For all LG sentences ϕ, if Θ ⊢ ϕ, then Z ⊢ ϕ∗.
– i.e. if a geometrical statement is derivable from Θ, then its image under the sort of interpretation
described above is provable in Z. This concretely illustrates what Hilbert and Bernays appear to
have intended in their original description of the method of arithmetization in remarking that the
geometrical axioms are translated into provable arithmetical statements (1934, p. 3). And this in
turn equips Hilbert with a reply to another of Frege’s challenges (cf. letter IV/5 pp. 47-48) in that
it demonstrates that geometrical theorems are translated by his methods into arithmetical truths.55
Bernays repeatedly described the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem as a ‘finite’ or ‘proof
theoretic sharpening of Gödel’s Completeness Theorem’.56 One way of understanding this is that
in the form of Theorem 5.2i what is yielded is not a model satisfying a given consistent set Γ, but
rather arithmetical formulas ψ1(~x), . . . , ψk(~x) with arities matching those of the non-logical symbols
of LT. If Γ is indeed consistent, we have seen how the ψi(~x)s may be interpreted in the standard
model of arithmetic N to determine extensions for the symbols of LT so as to then determine a
model M |= Γ. In this way we are equipped with finitary descriptions of the sorts of sets which
54On these steps see (Dean 2019a), (Hájek and Pudlák 1998, §I.4b) and (Feferman 1988). But also note that
Theorem 3.1i easily goes through in the case that Z = PA which is a subtheory of the system Zµ in which Hilbert and
Bernays conducted most of their metamathematical investigations in (1939). They also state that they regarded ‘the
expression “finitary” not as a sharply delimited endpoint, but rather as a designation of a methodological guideline’
(1939, p. 347). Hence the technicalities involved with formalization in weak fragments of first-order arithmetic need
not be taken as a central concern here.
55This assumes, of course, the soundness of arithmetical theories such as PRA. But this presumably would not
have presented an issue for Hilbert and Bernays if they were indeed willing to regard them as contentual.
56E.g. (1939, p. VI, 191, 243).
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would exist were N to exist as a ‘completed totality’ about which we can reason proof theoretically
within the contentual theory Z. But note that Theorem 5.2i itself does not entail the existence of N
or any other infinitary structure. And this in turn illustrates a means by which the Completeness
Theorem may indeed be made accessible from the finitary standpoint.57
Some evidence that Bernays viewed matters in this way is provided by the discussion which
follows his presentation of Gödel’s original completeness proof in (1939). He observes that Gödel’s
result leads to a reduction in the Entscheidungsproblem in the sense that it allows us to identify
the valid formulas of first-order logic with the provable ones (p. 189). But on the other hand, he
also notes that there is a step in Gödel’s proof which is non-constructive – or as he puts it ‘requires
the application of the “tertium non datur” for integers’ (p. 188). In virtue of this he concludes
that Gödel’s proof is not finitary as it stands and thus that completeness may only apply to ‘the
set-theoretic treatment’ of logic.58 As a potential remedy he then introduces the notion of ‘effective
satisfiability’ [effektive Erfüllbarkeit] (p. 198) – i.e. the satisfiability of a formula by sets which are
not only arithmetically definable but also computable [berechenbare]. But after posing the question
of whether completeness continues to hold in this case – i.e. is every consistent first-order formula
effectively satisfiable? – he conjectures a negative answer (p. 199).59
The passage quoted at the beginning of this section suggests that Bernays may have initially
resisted the thought that the Completeness Theorem in its original form compels us to acknowledge
the ‘independent existence’ of a model of a theory like Θ which cannot be satisfied in a finite domain.
As we have seen, however, Theorem 5.2i yields the existence of a proof-theoretic interpretation of
Θ in Z which supplies L1
Z
-formulas γ(x, y, z) and ζ(x, y, z) which would define extensions for the
predicates Gr and Zw in a model T |= Θ which would exist were the existence of N itself to be
granted. But since γ(x, y, z) and ζ(x, y, z) are arithmetical formulas, it then becomes natural to
ask whether they determine computable relations. For if a positive answer were obtained then we
would also be able to decide if the collinearity and betweenness relations hold between given triples
of points in T by proving or refuting statements of the forms γ(n,m, q) or ζ(n,m, q) within Z. Thus
if Θ is effectively satisfiable, there would exist an effective means of making such determinations
57See Sieg (2013, §II.10) for a related reconstruction of the finitary standpoint in terms of what he calls ‘accessible
domains’. Quine (1970, p. 53-56) also makes a similar point about how the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem can
be used to ‘save on sets’ in the course of advocating for a substitutional analysis of logical validity.
58Bernays (1950) formulates a similar point: ‘Of course – from the standpoint of classical mathematics and logic
– this [identification of existence with consistency obtained from the Completeness Theorem] is a valid equivalence.
But using this equivalence to interpret existence statements is surely unsatisfactory: If the claim that there is an
exception to a universal proposition is considered to be in need of a contentual explanation, since it is an existential
statement, then the negation of that universal proposition certainly is not clearer as to its content.’ (p. 98)
59It is now well-known that Gödel’s result may not only be formalized using the principle known as Weak König’s
Lemma [WKL] (i.e. ‘every infinite binary tree has an infinite path’) but is in fact equivalent to this principle over
the weak base theory RCA0 (see note 48) in the case of computably axiomatizable theories. But although a similar
argument had been employed by Skolem (1923) in his attempt to avoid the use of the Axiom of Choice in the proof
of Löwenheim’s Theorem, WKL is still prima facie non-constructive as selecting a path through a given tree may
involve a choice between alternatives which cannot be effectively decided. This was later made precise by Kleene
(1950) to yield the result ‘there exists an infinite computable binary tree which does not contain a computable path’.
Bernays already anticipated this in observing that Gödel’s proof involves a non-finitary application of the law of the
excluded middle to arithmetical formulas with unbounded quantifiers in order to obtain a model M |= ϕ from a tree
determined by a sequence of finite “approximating” modelsMn. But on the other hand, it is now known that that the
adjunction of WKL to RCA0 yields an extension which is conservative for Π
0
2-statements over PRA. This illustrates
a sense in which the proof of the Completeness Theorem can be regarded as non-constructive but still finitary (see
also note 65 and Sieg 2013, p. 316 for a similar point).
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even if we do not wish to accord T (or N ) ‘independent existence’.60
Of course other variants of the Completeness Theorem will often yield a great many models of Γ
– e.g. one of every infinite cardinality if Γ possesses an infinite model at all, one definable at every
level of the arithmetical hierarchy extending ∆02 if Γ is an essentially undecidable theory interpreting
Robinson’s Q etc. According to the familiar perspective of platonism – and absent various domain-
specific constraints which might be thought to rule out various ‘unintended’ interpretations (which
I will discuss in the next section) – these models will all exist on an equal ontological footing. But
recall that thesis (2iii) concerns not just the “bare” existence of a model M |= Γ but rather the
difficulty of demonstrating that such a structure exists.61
Bernays’s introduction of the notion of effective satisfiability can thus be seen as suggesting a
further refinement into how we might understand the existence of infinitary structures. For we can
ask not only after the cardinality of a structure satisfying a given set of axioms Γ, but also the
potential complexity of the formulas which determine an arithmetical model. We can then take
advantage of the well-known correspondence between arithmetical and computational complexity
of the sort adverted to at the end of §4 to make distinctions not just between finite and infinite
models but between ones which can and cannot be effectively constructed or decided.
In order to make sense of this latter distinction, it is useful to recall the difference between
the atomic and elementary diagrams of a model M. Supposing for simplicity that M has a purely
relational language L = {P1, . . . , Pk}, its atomic diagram Diagat(M) ofM corresponds to the set of
atomic sentences which it satisfies when new constant symbols a0, a1, . . . are added for each element
of its domain A – i.e. the statements Pi(~a) such that M |= Pi(~a) and ~a ∈ Ari . The elementary
diagram Diagel(M) of M is similarly defined as the set of L-formulas ϕ(~a) such that M |= ϕ(~a).
Note also that if M is an arithmetical model, then A ⊆ N in which case the new constants can
be taken to be numerals. In this case both Diagat(M) and Diagel(M) will be countable and
thus, relative to a suitable Gödel numbering, we can also ask after their definitional (and hence
computational) complexity. Recall finally that a relation R ⊆ Nk is ∆02-definable if it is both Σ
0
2-
and Π02-definable – i.e. there exist L
1
Z
-formulas ϕ(~x, y, z) and ψ(~x, y, z) such that R = {~n ∈ Nk :
N |= ∃y∀zϕ(~n, y, z)} = {~n ∈ Nk : N |= ∀y∃zψ(~n, y, z)}.
What Theorem 5.2ii reports is that any consistent computable axiomatizable theory T not only
has an arithmetical model, but one whose atomic diagram is definable in this restricted manner.
60Although this may at first seem like a purely epistemological consideration, the definitional complexity of γ(x, y, z)
and ζ(x, y, z) will also determine whether these formulas are ‘absolute’ with respect to arbitrary arithmetical models of
Θ – e.g. whether the fact that T |= Zw(n,m, q) is sufficient to ensure that this relationship continues to hold in another
model T ′ defined relative to a potentially nonstandard interpretation of Z. For recall that the computable subsets of
Nk are definable by ∆01-formulas of L1Z which are in turn absolute with respect to nonstandard interpretations. The
question of whether a given theory T is effectively satisfiable thus also tracks the extent to which the predicates ψi(~x)
provided by Theorem 5.2 rigidly determine their extensions.
61It was, of course, Bernays who introduced the term ‘platonism’ (with the lowercase ‘p’) into philosophy of
mathematics in his paper ‘Sur le platonisme dans les mathématiques’ (1935). This term is now often used to describe
a view which regards the structures studied in infintary mathematics as independently existing abstract objects. But
Bernays himself distinguished between different grades of platonism [suppositions «platoniciennes»] the weakest of
which accepts precisely the existence of the natural numbers and the applicability of tertium non datur to arithmetical
formulas. But he also considers a much stronger grade which postulates ‘the existence of a world of ideal objects
containing all the objects and relations of mathematics’ but concludes that such an ‘absolute platonism’ has been
shown to be inconsistent in light of the set-theoretic antinomies. Much of his paper is thus devoted to characterizing
various intermediate grades of platonism – e.g. in the form of something akin to modern reconstructions of Weyl’s
predicativism. As such, another way of approaching thesis (2iii) is via the question: Which of Bernays’s grades of
platonism allow for the passage from consistency to existence?
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In order to appreciate the significance of this, recall that it is a consequence of Kleene’s Hierarchy
Theorem that the ∆02-definable sets properly extend the Σ
0
1- and Π
0
1-definable sets but are properly
contained in the Σ02- and Π
0
2-definable sets – i.e. if we equate a formula class with its name then
Σ01  ∆
0
2 ( Σ
0
2 and Π
0
1 ( ∆
0
2 ( Π
0
2. This illustrates a sense in which deciding membership
in a ∆02-definable set is more difficult than deciding membership in either a Σ
0
1-definable – i.e.
computably enumerable – set or a Π01-definable set. On the other hand, this task is easier than
deciding membership in either a Σ02- or Π
0
2-definable set in the sense measured by the arithmetical
hierarchy.
Note also that in the case that M is an arithmetical model, it is possible to go backwards from
the atomic diagram of M to effectively construct the extensions of the predicates in L as the sets
{~n : P (~n) ∈ Diagat(M)}. In this sense Theorem 5.2ii may be understood as a positive result
in the sense that one might a priori expect that certain mathematical theories contain predicates
whose extensions must necessarily be highly complex in all of their models (as will be illustrated
in §6).62 But also recall that in light of Post’s Theorem the computable sets correspond to the
∆01-definable sets – i.e. those which are definable by both Σ
0
1- and Π
0
1-formulas – and that this
class of sets is a proper subset of both the Σ01- and the Π
0
1-definable sets. Thus in posing the
question of whether completeness continues to hold if we demand not just satisfiability but effective
satisfiability, Bernays was in effect asking whether Theorem 5.2ii can be strengthened to assert that
every consistent formula is satisfied in a model all of whose relations are ∆01-definable.
This question was answered in the negative via a series of results inspired by Bernays’s conjecture
leading to the following concisely statable theorem of Rabin (1958):
Theorem 5.3. Let GB− be the axioms of Gödel-Bernays set theory without the Axiom of Infinity
formulated in the one-sorted language LS = {∈}. Suppose thatM = 〈N, E〉 is an arithmetical model
of GB− where E ⊆ N2 interprets ∈. Then E is not a Σ01 (i.e. computably enumerable) relation.
As Bernays (1937) had shown that GB− is finitely axiomatizable, this provides a precise negative
answer to his question about effective satisfiability – i.e. the conjunction of the axioms of GB− is a
single first-order sentence which is not effectively satisfiable. On the other hand, GB− is otherwise
a much stronger theory than any of those considered above – e.g. it is strong enough to prove the
existence (as classes) of all arithmetically definable sets. One might expect on this basis that the
interpretation of ∈ in any model of GB− must inevitably be complex relative to the arithmetical
hierarchy. But although Theorem 5.3 shows that membership can never be a computably enumerable
relation (and thus also not a computable one) in any model of GB−, Theorem 5.2ii can also be
invoked to show that there is an arithmetical model of this theory in which ∈ is ∆02-definable.
This sequence of observations can be extended to show that there exist finite theories Γ which
are not satisfiable in any model consisting of sets definable by Σ01 ∪ Π
0
1-predicates. This result is
due to Putnam (1957) who described it as demonstrating that Theorem 5.2ii is the ‘best possible’
strengthening of the Completeness Theorem. The foregoing results may thus be understood as con-
firming thesis (2iii) in the following precise sense: while every consistent computably axiomatizable
theory will have a ∆02-model, there exist single first-order sentences which do not have Σ
0
1 ∪ Π
0
1
models. If the difficulty of demonstrating the existence of M |= Γ is equated with the difficulty
62For note that the∆02 sets also correspond to those hich are limit computable in the sense of Putnam and Shoenfield
(see, e.g., Soare 2016, §3.5). In other words A is ∆02 just in case there is a so-called trial and error procedure for
deciding n ∈ A – i.e. one for which membership can be determined by following a guessing procedure which may
make a finite number of initial errors before it eventually converges to the correct answer.
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of deciding membership in its relations than M and the latter is equated with the position of the
relevant sets in Kleene’s arithmetical hierarchy, then these results suggest that the former task is
indeed as easy as possible conditional on having determined the consistency of Γ (which we have
seen has Π01-complexity).
The practical significance of these results can be illustrated relative to the specific theories we
have been considering. For on the one hand, after the 1930s Bernays turned towards set theory in
part because he wanted to complete the project of axiomatizing analysis which he had begun in
(1939, Sup. IV). It was in this context where he introduced the theory GB− in (1942) and showed
how it could be used to formalize real numbers as Dedekind cuts corresponding to infinite classes
of rationals. Relative to such a formalization, Bernays showed that results such as the Bolzano-
Weierstrass Theorem were provable in GB− from which it follows that this theory is also sufficiently
strong to formalize Hilbert’s original geometrical consistency proofs based on analytical models.63
But on the other hand, we can see that GB− is paradigmatic of a formal theory in Hilbert and
Bernays’s sense – i.e. not only does it fail to have a finite model, but it also fails to be effectively
satisfiable. On the other hand, it follows from the work of Tarski discussed in the next section that
while geometric theories like HP do not possess finite models, they are still effectively satisfiable.
These considerations point towards another means of precisifying thesis (2iii) which builds on
part iii) of Theorem 5.2. We have just seen that part ii) is optimal in the sense that while it implies
that every computably axiomatizable theory has an arithmetical model whose elementary diagram
is ∆02-definable, there are specific theories (like GB
−) for which this is indeed the ‘simplest’ model.
Part iii) entails the potentially more surprising fact that every such theory T has an arithmetical
model M whose entire elementary diagram is ∆02-definable. But note that Diagel(M) acts as a
satisfaction predicate for M in the sense that the membership of ϕ(~a) in this set determines if
the formula ϕ(~x) is satisfied by the vector objects ~a from its domain. Thus for instance there are
models M satisfying GB− – or even stronger theories which prove the existence of uncountable sets
like GB or ZF – in which not just the membership relation but the entire truth relation M |= ϕ for
sentences of arbitrary complexity is ∆02-definable.
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Such observations can in turn be used to illustrate another dimension of the difficulty of demon-
strating the existence of a model M of a given consistent theory T – i.e. rather than asking how
hard it is to decide Diagat(M), we can also ask what resources are required to prove the existence
of the set Diagel(M) from which M can be recovered as a structure. The foregoing results illus-
trate that the existence of such a set can be demonstrated using a restriction of the comprehension
scheme of a theory like GB or ZF to a small fragment of arithmetical formulas. But using the more
63From the contemporary perspective this can be seen directly as GB− is mutually interpretable with the theory
of second-order arithmetic known ACA0 which extends RCA0 with comprehension or first-order arithmetical formulas
with second-order parameters. See note 48 and (Dean and Walsh 2017, §2).
64Although this may seem like a substantial improvement upon Theorem 5.2ii), the fundamental insight behind
part iii) can already be read off from the familiar method of Henkin’s completeness proof. For instance a Σ02-definition
for M |= ϕ(~c) (where in this case ~c is an appropriate vector of ‘Henkin constants’) can first be obtained by observing
that a sufficient condition for the constructed model M to satisfy ϕ(~c) is for there to exist a stage in the completion
procedure at which this sentence can be added to the maximally complete set Γ∗ ⊇ Γ being constructed such that its
adjunction preserves consistency – a fact which we have seen is equivalent to a Π01-statement. But in virtue of the
completeness of Γ∗, this is then equivalent to the Π02-condition that there is no stage at which ¬ϕ(~c) can be consistently
adjoined. Related observations about the Henkin procedure can also be used to provide an alternative computability-
theoretic analysis of the Completeness Theorem obtained by Jockusch and Soare (1972): every consistent computably
axiomatized theory T has a completion T∗ ⊇ T which is is low in the Turing degrees – i.e. deg(T∗) =T ∅′ and thus
also an arithmetical model M whose atomic diagram is of low degree.
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refined techniques of Reverse Mathematics (in the sense of Simpson 2009), it can also be shown
that a considerably weaker system of second-order arithmetic is already sufficient. A paradigmatic
result in this regard is that the theory WKL0 consisting of IΣ1 together with comprehension for ∆01-
formulas and a form of König’s Infinity Lemma for binary trees is sufficient to prove the existence
of Diagel(M) for some model M |= T. This theory can also be shown to be weak in other respects
– e.g. since WKL0 is Π02-conservative over PRA, it does not prove any consistency statements that
are not already provable in PRA. This illustrates in yet another way in which the task of proving
the existence of a model M |= T is easy – now measured in terms of the strength of the theory
required to prove that Diagel(M) exists – conditional on T’s consistency.
65
6 Consistency and existence, redux
The foregoing arguments for theses (2ii) and (2iii) involve notions which were not available at the
time of Frege’s correspondence with Hilbert. It would thus be an anachronism to ask whether they
themselves would have accepted the precise analyses of the difficulty of determining consistency –
i.e. the Π01-completeness of deciding membership in the set Con of consistent first-order formulas –
or the ease of demonstrating existence – i.e. the fact that every consistent computably axiomatizable
theory has a ∆02-arithmetical model whose existence can be proven in a weak fragment of second-
order arithmetic – which I have proposed. But it should now be evident that the definitions and
results on which these analyses depend grew in a direct and conceptually motivated manner out
of developments which their exchange helped to initiate. It is also clear that they relate to the
problematic of whether (and in what sense) consistency implies existence within the historical
frame of the Hilbert program.
It is, however, also reasonable to ask how the proposed analyses bear on these notions as they
are employed in contemporary practice, both inside and outside of mathematics. A paramount
concern among contemporary readers is likely to be that even in its original form, the Completeness
Theorem appears to allow existence to be demonstrated in too wide a range of cases. An incipient
version of this worry is already illustrated by another of Frege’s famous challenges to Hilbert:
Suppose we knew that the propositions
1) a is an intelligent being
2) a is omnipresent
3) a is omnipotent
together with all their consequences did not contradict one another; could we infer from this that there
was an omnipotent, omnipresent, intelligent being? This is not evident to me. (IV/5, p. 47)
Suppose we formalize 1) - 3) in the obvious manner by treating a as a constant symbol and
‘intelligent’, ‘omnipresent’, and ‘omnipotent’ as primitive unary predicates to yield the set Ω =
65See (Simpson 2009, §II.8, §IV.3) for a presentation of the relevant results about WKL0 and (Dean and Walsh
2017, §3) for further discussion of their historical context in regard to Gödel’s original completeness proof. The
framework of computable model theory and Reverse Mathematics also allows for the formulation of a number of more
refined questions bearing on whether (or in what sense) consistency implies existence – e.g. Is the difficulty of proving
the existence of a model of T better understood in terms of constructing Diagat(M) or Diagel(M)? To what extent
can these sets differ in complexity? How should theories be compared in strength in regard to their set (or model)
existence consequences? In order to demonstrate the existence of a set (or model) must we show that it is the unique
set (or model) satisfying some expressible property? Although these questions are of a more technical nature than
can be explored here see, e.g., (Ash and Knight 2000) and (Eastaugh 2019).
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{Int(a),Omnipot (a),Omnipres(a)}. In this case it is indeed easy to show that Ω is consistent, ei-
ther by a technique such as cut elimination or by directly constructing a model G in which a denotes
an arbitrary object and then interpreting Int ,Omnipot ,Omnipres to hold of it. But since we could,
e.g., take a to denote the Empire State Building in such a model, in neither case do we take this to
demonstrate that there is an omnipotent, omnipresent, and intelligent being.
Although this example is trivial as it stands, one can readily foresee Frege extending it by
subjecting the senses of these predicates to conceptual analysis so as to obtain another set of
statements Ω+ which records additional relationships between them in an enriched language –
perhaps even in the manner of the ontological argument. Suppose further that it is still possible
to demonstrate the consistency of Ω+ by some suitably non-model theoretic means. In this case,
the Completeness Theorem could then be invoked to yield a model G+ |= Ω+ in which a would
denote some object b in the domain of G+ which simultaneously satisfies the potentially complex
formulas Int+,Omnipot+,Omnipres+ which result from such an analysis. But it requires only
passing familiarity with a typical proof of completeness to realize that this will be far from sufficient
to ensure the object b will be endowed with all of the properties commonly associated with intelligent,
omnipotent, omnipresent beings. For instance in the case of Gödel’s original proof, b will be a natural
number – say 17 – and the case of Henkin’s (1949) proof b will be one of countably many witness
constants – say c17. But we do not take the existence of either sort of object as testament to
the existence of God. And if Ω+ were to similarly entail the existence of infinitely many objects
satisfying the descriptions of angels and archangels, we would not conventionally take the existence
of the overall structure G+ to confirm the existence of such a heavenly host.
The whimsical quality of this example derives at least in part from its non-mathematical char-
acter. For we can also imagine Hilbert attempting to accommodate Frege’s point by observing that
while he was presumably thinking of Ω as a contentual theory (in virtue of being bound to a subject
matter, however ethereal), the slogan ‘consistency implies existence’ was only intended to apply to
formal theories. But as we have seen, Hilbert and Bernays took theories of this latter sort to be
divorced from particular subject matter and instead regarded them as implicit definitions of variable
systems of objects and relations. Several theorist have suggested on this basis that at the time of
(1899) Hilbert can be regarded as embracing a form of structuralism – e.g. rather than regarding
the subject matter of geometry as being that of space and attendant spatial notions of points and
lines, Hilbert understood it as being the relations which hold between arbitrary systems of objects
which satisfy axioms which we customarily express using the terms ‘point’ and ‘line’.66 Parsons
(2014) has additionally suggested that such a view is more systematically evident in the writings of
Bernays from the 1920s onwards – e.g. if we recall his notion of relative existence from (1950) it is
66For instance Shapiro (1997, p. 162), (2005, p. 205) cites one of the passages from the correspondence quoted
above in support of such an interpretation: ‘[I]t is surely obvious that every theory is only a scaffolding or schema
of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be thought of in
any way one likes . . . One only needs to apply a reversible one-one transformation and lay it down that the axioms
shall be correspondingly the same for the transformed things’ (IV/4, p. 42). Here Hilbert does indeed appear to
anticipate the fact that isomorphic structures are elementarily equivalent – a fact which is further confirmed by his
invocation of the ‘principle of duality’ from projective geometry as an illustration (on which see Eder and Schiemer
2018). This appears to be compatible with the contemporary understanding of structures as isomorphism types. And
at least in retrospect, Hilbert’s aim in articulating his Vollstandigkeitsaxiom can be understood as that of providing a
categorical axiomatization of Euclidean geometry. But on the other hand, theories like HP which play the primary role
in Grundlagen der Geometrie admit many non-isomorphic models (even in a given cardinality) – a fact that Hilbert
repeatedly exploits this fact in his independence proofs. This in turn suggests that what is ‘implicitly defined’ by
such theories are more akin to classes of models than to ‘structures’ in the sense of most contemporary expositions.
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not difficult to see him endorsing the view that ‘all there is to being’ a particular point A or line ℓ
is to stand in the appropriate relation to other points and lines.
Such an interpretation is helpful for making sense of the prior example. For if we maintain
that ‘consistency implies existence’ only applies when we are willing to adopt a structuralist view
about the theory under consideration, then Frege’s example can be explained away in virtue of the
fact that we are not willing to regard the fact that an object b stands in appropriate relations to
a given set of objects comprising a model of Ω+ as a sufficient condition for its godliness. On the
other hand, it is more difficult to reconcile what Hilbert and Bernays say about implicit definition
with a recognized form of structuralism once the status which they wished to assign arithmetical
theories such as PRA is taken into account. For since they regarded such theories as contentual, they
presumably thought (pace Shapiro 1997, p. 165) that there is indeed more to an object being (say)
the number 17 then standing in the 18th position in some ω-sequence – e.g. it must presumably
also have the appropriate sort of contentual representation.67
This in turn raises another sort of concern about the sort of models whose existence is entailed
by the Completeness Theorem. For as was noted in passing above, Gödel’s original construction
will always produce a model M |= Γ with domain N as long as Γ possesses at least one infinite
model.68 Together with Bernays’s refinements, I have suggested in §5 that it is this feature which
would provide a contentual representation of a satisfying structure as a set of arithmetical predicates
which would provide extensions for the non-logical symbols in LΓ were the existence of the standard
model of first-order arithmetic N itself to be granted. But even if we are willing to take the latter
67In at least the case of catgeorical theories, it may be possible to acknowledge the current point while also
assimilating Hilbert’s position to the familiar taxonomy of contemporary structuralisms. Such an attempt is made by
Doherty (2019) who suggests that the general strategy of Hilbert’s replies to Frege can be understood as anticipating
a form of non-eliminative structuralism similar to that of Shapiro (1997). (A similar interpretation is also developed
by Isaacson 2011.) A more ambitious reconstruction is proposed by Sieg (1990, 2014, 2020) who seeks to synthesize
the view of mathematical existence Hilbert held around 1900 based on his work in geometry with that which he
came to develop in the 1920s based on his work in metamathematics. Sieg suggests that Hilbert transitioned from
an understanding of the axioms of (e.g.) analysis or number theory as characterizations of mathematical structures
in a manner similar to Dedekind (1888) during the prior period to one on which such theories need to be understood
‘formally’ in contradistinction to ‘contentual axiomatics’ as described in §5 during the latter period. But as Sieg
also stresses, the proof theoretic strategies of finitary mathematics can be understood as a means of ‘reducing’
or ‘projecting’ infinitary structures to contentual representations given relative to inductively generated ‘accessible
domains’ as typified by the natural numbers. The choice of underlying ontology aside, such an approach has an
obvious affinity to various formulations of eliminative structuralism which identify ‘structures’ with sets within the
iterative hierarchy rather than taking them to be free-standing objects in their own right (see, e.g. Reck and Price
2000). One could similarly look upon the interpretation developed in §5 as a means of understanding Hilbert and
Bernays as “number theoretic structuralists” who seek to represent infinitary structures (inclusive of uncountable
ones) via arithmetical models.
68It is also reasonable at this point to ask whether other proofs of the Completeness Theorem fare any better in
delivering what we would conventionally describe as ‘intended’ models. A canvas of other familiar alternatives –
e.g. the method of maximally complete sets employed by Henkin (1949) or the interpretation in a Boolean algebra
employed by Rasiowa and Sikorski (1953) – would suggest not. But since a completeness proof must deliver a
satisfying model in the case of any consistent set Γ, it is difficult to imagine how there could be a general method
for constructing intended models which takes into account all of the different subject-specific associations we might
have for different choices of LΓ. And thus since all that will be common across different choices of Γ will be the
metatheoretic definitions of provability and satisfiability themselves, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion that
there is indeed an affinity between the sort of mathematical existence which can be promised by a completeness proof
and that which is common across most formulations of structuralism – i.e. a conception of a model (or structure)
M |= Γ as consisting of an arbitrary class of objects standing in the relations demanded by the definition of Γ ⊢ ϕ
together with sufficiently many other relationships to yield a bivalent definition of M |= ϕ(~a).
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step ourselves, we might still be resistant to accepting the induced arithmetical model as a sufficient
condition for the existence of the sort of model we take to be described by Γ. In fact it appears that
in many branches of mathematics we have a prior practice of endowing the terms in their languages
with meanings which are sufficiently precise to prejudice us in favor of some interpretations (and
against others) but which do not completely determine the structure of a satisfying model in the
manner which Hilbert and Bernays demanded of contentual theories.
A familiar case in point is provided by axiomatic set theories such as ZF (or GB) and their
extensions by large cardinal hypotheses. For it is commonly said that we have a sufficient un-
derstanding of the membership relation in order to both justify the axioms of such theories and
see that they are satisfied in the so-called cumulative hierarchy V defined by iterating the ranks
V(0) = ∅,V(α + 1) = P(V(α)),V(λ) =
⋃
α<λ V(α).
69 Such theories are, of course, famously far
away from cases in which direct consistency proofs via methods like cut elimination are applicable.
But the informal picture is often taken as an adequate bona fides for the consistency of ZF even if it
leaves open certain questions about the structure of V. Of course if Con(ZF) is accepted, Theorem
5.2ii can be applied to yield (e.g.) an arithmetical model U = 〈N, E〉 similar to the one considered
in Theorem 5.3 in which E provides a ∆02-interpretation of ∈. But on the other hand, even if our
grasp of V is partial in certain specific respects – e.g. in regard to how far the V (α)’s extend into
the transfinite or about the cardinaility of P(ω) – the familiar picture is also conventionally taken
to ensure us that it differs from U both in virtue of being uncountable and also in assigning ∈ a
highly complex interpretation.70
Of course Hilbert and Bernays may have welcomed this sort of example as it illustrates how
it is possible to assimilate set theoretic reasoning to their finitary standpoint.71 But if we do not
adopt this perspective ourselves, then the foregoing example will be taken by many contemporary
theorists to illustrate a case in which we believe we possess prima facie justification to accept the
consistency of a theory while at the same time fearing that the sort of ‘existence’ of a satisfying
model which it is endowed by the Completeness Theorem is purchased too cheaply. And of course
this problem is compounded once well-known formal independence and relative consistency proofs
are taken into account. For it is then easy to multiply examples in which the theorem appears to
overgenerate models whose existence we might otherwise not wish to countenance.
A familiar but germane example is provided by the application of Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem to sufficiently strong theories of arithmetic such as PA. For in particular, Gödel’s result
shows that if PA is consistent, then Con(PA) is underivable in PA and thus that PA + ¬Con(PA)
69See (Kreisel 1967) or (Isaacson 2011) for a canonical exposition of this view.
70For note that ZF proves the existence of every L1Z-definable subset of the natural numbers and also that V is an
ω-model and as such agrees with N on (the set-theoretic translations of) all arithmetical sentences. It thus follows
– essentially by Tarksi’s theorem on the undefinability of truth – that the restriction of ∈V even to arithmetically
definable members of P(ω + 1) cannot be arithmetically definable (and thus ipso facto not ∆02).
71Were they to have done so explicitly, the contemporary tendency would be to brand them as “Skolemites”
who perniciously deny the referential determinacy of set-theoretic notions. But the application of such labels is
anachronistic in several respects. For despite Hilbert’s early interest in the Continuum Hypothesis (1900a; 1925),
Bernays original axiomatic development of set theory appears to have been more directly motivated by the goal of
providing a smooth formalization of analysis in a manner which continued the treatment in higher-order arithmetic
initiated in (1939, Sup. IV). Such a classification also fails to take into account the subtleties of Bernays’s personal
engagement with the ‘Skolem paradox’ in the course of which he both (e.g.) acknowledges that ‘the graduations of
cardinalities are in a certain way unreal’ while also stressing that ‘classical mathematics does not have reasons to
transgress . . . the axiomatic and logistic analysis of mathematical theories’ (1957, p. 117). An interesting question
which cannot be explored here is whether his later work (1976b) on the second-order reformulation of Lévy’s reflection
scheme and large cardinals caused him to change his view.
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is also consistent. So if we are willing to accept that PA is consistent – e.g. because we regard it
as a contentual theory – then the Completeness Theorem can be invoked to secure the existence
of a model M |= PA + ¬Con(PA). But of course such a model will not only be nonstandard – i.e.
not isomorphic to N – but it will simultaneously affirm Z and deny its consistency in the relevant
internal sense. Shapiro has suggested that this situation in particular can be understood to present
problems for both finitists like Hilbert and Bernays and contemporary structuralists.
One way of understanding the problem which Shapiro (1997, pp. 134-135), (2005, pp. 71-
74) takes the existence of models like M to pose for finitists is that their existence requires them
to acknowledge what might be called a ‘relativity of arithmetical notions’. For once PA (or a
weaker theory) has been accepted as contentua and the second incompleteness theorem has been
demonstrated to hold for it, there is at least a temptation to regard a theory like PA+¬Con(PA) as an
implicit definition of a structure whose existence must then be affirmed in light of the Completeness
Theorem. But as we have seen in §3, Hilbert and Bernays also anticipated Gödel’s observations
about the entanglement of metamathematical and arithmetical notions as embodied, e.g., by the
Π01-definition of Con(Γ). And thus since M is a model of the theory PA, this might cause us to
fear that the very notion of consistency is itself model-relative (and thus presumably also non-
contentual) in the sense that Con(PA) might be true in one model but false in another. But then
if we persist in equating consistency and existence, it might seem that the existence of a model of
PA would then itself be thrown into doubt.
But not only did Bernays anticipate this sort of scenario, it is also clear that – at least in
hindsight – he would have been in a position to reply to Shapiro’s concern. For building on the
work of Feferman (1960), the foregoing situation can be sharpened to show that there is a proof-
theoretic interpretation (·)∗ : L1
Z
→ L1
Z
of PA + ¬Con(PA) in PA. But then reasoning within PA
itself, it is possible to see that the model defined by (·)∗ must be an end extension of what we take to
be the standard (or ‘ground’) model of PA and also that any element b in this model which codes a
proof of a contradiction must itself be nonstandard. It is thus possible to see from within PA that b
is a sort of ideal object – akin to a point at infinity in geometry – and thus also that PA+¬Con(PA)
is not a contentual theory. But once this has been agreed, the existence of models like M need not
be seen as threatening either the contentual status of PA or that of the notion of consistency itself.
For to repeat, Hilbert and Bernays took certain arithmetical theories to be contentual in virtue
of their intrinsic relation to a specific subject matter – e.g. calculations performed on numerals in
stroke notation. But since the argument just rehearsed can be conducted within such a theory itself,
it shows in a contentual manner that the distinct theory PA+ ¬Con(PA) lacks this property.72
In at least this sense, the existence of nonstandard (and possibly other sorts of “unintended”)
models which exist as consequences of the Completeness Theorem does not seem to block the
argument which I have suggested in §5 allows for the acceptance of the slogan ‘consistency implies
existence’ from the finitary standpoint. But at the same time Shapiro and other structuralists have
also suggested for other reasons that consistency is still too liberal a standard for existence and
ought to be replaced with a condition often referred to as coherence.73 On Shapiro’s (1997, pp.
135-136) formulation this notion is not defined mathematically but rather treated as a primitive
72With respect to Bernays’s antiticipation of Shapiro’s problematic see, e.g., (1950, p. 101) and (1957, p. 118).
The relevant result of Feferman is Theorem 6.5 in (1960) he glosses as follows: ‘In other words we can construct a
“non-standard model” of PA within PA which . . . we can verify, axiom by axiom, to be a model of PA + ¬Con(PA)’
(p. 77). See (Dean 2019a, pp. 14-15) for the additional argument needed to verify within PA that this model must
also be an end extension.
73E.g. Hellman (1989, p. 19), (2005, p. 556).
40
whose intended sense is likened to (but not identified with) that of satisfiability, potentially in a
proper-class sized structure. With this notion in place, Shapiro (1997, p. 95) includes the following
as an axiom of his structure theory:
Coherence If ϕ is a coherent formula in a second-order language, then there is a structure that
satisfies ϕ.
By adopting such principles, contemporary structuralists attempt to obtain a portion of the
ontological richness for mathematics which Hilbert pronounced with the bold claim ‘if the given
axioms do not contradict one another . . . then the things defined by the axioms exist’. But on the
other hand Shapiro explicitly denies that PA+¬Con(PA) is a coherent theory. Part of his rationale
for doing so is programmatic – i.e. although PA + ¬Con(PA) is consistent, it does not possess a
model relative to the ‘standard’ semantics for second-order logic which he wishes to employ for
the interpretation of his axiomatization of structure theory. It should be observed, however, that
neither second-order logic nor recent debates about its proper interpretation have played a role in
the foregoing. But independently of this Shapiro also asserts his prior refusal to countenance as
structures nonstandard models of arithmetical theories (1997, p. 133). As a result, he effectively
cuts off his own development of structuralism from the hope of replacing his Coherence axiom with
a mathematical result which might be proven in the spirit of the Completeness Theorem.
In order to see this, it suffices to observe that set Val2 of second-order validities is Π2-complete
in the Lévy hierarchy (Väänänen 2001, Theorem 1). Val2 is thus not Σmn for any m,n ∈ N – i.e. it
is “above” the generalized analytical hierarchy and hence of vastly greater complexity then the Π01
set Val of first-order validities. It is also easy to see that even the set of first-order arithmetical
sentences ϕ ∈ L1
Z
which are structure-theoretically satisfiable in Shapiro’s sense corresponds to
precisely those which are true in N .74 But if we let
∧
PA2 denote the conjunction of the axioms
of second-order Peano arithmetic, it then follows that the set of sentences ϕ such that
∧
PA2 → ϕ
is structure-theoretically valid is ∆11-complete and thus cannot correspond to the set of sentences
provable relative to any computably enumerable deducibility relation for second-order logic. More
generally – but still apropos of Shapiro’s dialectic – this illustrates the necessity of countenancing
nonstandard models if we wish to vindicate a principle akin to ‘consistency implies existence’ via a
mathematical theorem rather than by fiat.75
7 From arithmetic back to geometry
This is not the place to assess whether the replacement of the mathematical definition of consistency
with an extra-mathematical notion such as coherence is a necessary or even a salutary aspect
of the development of structuralism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. But Shapiro’s
juxtaposition of Gödel’s completeness and incompleteness theorems highlights another aspect of
the relationship between consistency and existence which can be used to provide a final perspective
on the results discussed in §4 and §5. For recall that another consequence of Gödel’s arithmetization
of syntax is that the set Thm(T) = {pϕq : T ⊢ ϕ} of theorems of a computably axiomatizable theory
will always be at worst a Σ01-definable set – i.e. computably enumerable. On the other hand, if
74This follows since N is – up to isomorphism – the first-order reduct of the unique model of the axioms PA2 of
second-order arithmetic relative to the standard semantics.
75For instance given that PA 6⊢ Con(PA), such structures are needed as counter-models to show that PA 6|= Con(PA)
in much the same way non-Archimedean models of geometry are needed to show that the Archimedean axiom is not
a semantic consequence of HP. See (Isaacson 2011, pp. 27-30) for a related point.
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T is a consistent theory which includes or interprets Robinson’s Q, a generalized form of Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem entails that T is essentially undecidable – i.e. Thm(T) cannot be a
∆01-definable set nor can Thm(T
+) be computable for any consistent extension of T+ ⊇ T in the
same language. And thus in such cases the classification of Thm(T) as Σ01 is exact.
Starting in the late 1940 Tarski and his collaborators demonstrated that a surprising variety
of theories T which are not essentially undecidable are still simply undecidable – i.e. although T
may have some decidable extension, it is not possible to effectively decide whether T ⊢ ϕ for are
arbitrary LT-sentence ϕ.76 This includes the first-order theories of the integers in the language with
addition and multiplication Th(Z) = {ϕ : 〈Z,+,×〉 |= ϕ}, the theory of the rationals Th(Q) = {ϕ :
〈Q,+,×〉 |= ϕ}, and theory Th(F) of ordered fields. On the other hand, the foregoing examples are
all subtheories of a system now called RCF (for real closed fields) which Tarski also showed to be
complete – i.e. it proves or refutes every statement in its language – and hence also decidable.77
Tarski (1959) also presented a novel one-sorted axiomatization of geometry based on treating
equidistance of points as a primitive notion together with betweenness. In this language he presented
a set of axioms together with a first-order continuity axiom scheme (which ensures the existence of
definable Dedekind cuts) which form a theory E2 which Tarski called elementary geometry. Tarski
showed that E2 is sufficient to reconstruct Euclidean geometry in a manner similar to that in which
Hilbert had done in (1899). But he also showed that E2 is satisfied in a model R formed by
interpreting its language over the real field in a manner similar to Hilbert’s construction of the
models P and E over the minimal Pythagorean and Euclidean fields. In this manner it is possible
to show that E2 is mutually interpretable with RCF and thus also complete and decidable.
Tarski additionally posed the question whether the theories of Pythagorean and Euclidean planes
– which we have seen in §2 are axiomatized by Hilbert’s theories HP and HP+CCP – are decidable.
After much effort this question was answered in the negative by Ziegler (1982) who showed that
any finite subtheory of Th(R) = {ϕ : 〈R,+,×〉 |= ϕ} – which can be be shown to include Hilbert’s
theories relative to a suitable coordinatization – is undecidable. Although the work that led to this
result was again directly inspired by Grundlagen der Geometrie it was obtained more than 80 years
after its original publication. But as I will now suggest, it also provides a paradigmatic illustration
of the complexity of the relationship between consistency and existence.
Building first on the observation about arithmetical theories from above, suppose that T is
a consistent computably axiomatizable theory interpreting Q – a condition which includes both
contentual theories like PRA and infinitary ones like ZF. As we have seen, in this case the set
Thm(T) of theorems of T will be Σ01-definable but not ∆
0
1-definable. On the other hand, it is a
consequence of Theorem 5.2iii that there is an arithmetical modelM |= T whose elementary diagram
is Diagel(M) is ∆
0
2-definable. But since the restriction of Diagel(M) to LT is a complete theory
extending Thm(T), this cannot be improved to ∆01-definable in virtue of the essential undecidability
of T.
It thus follows that if we were to attempt to operationalize the application of the Completeness
Theorem in order to determine ifM |= ϕ orM |= ¬ϕ for each ϕ ∈ LT we would reach the conclusion
that infinitely many of these choices are not only unconstrained by the axioms and must be made
non-effectively. This concretely illustrates a sense in which the model M – as Bernays (1950) put
76See (Tarski et al. 1953), (Greenberg 2010), and (Makowsky 2019) for more on the history of and references to
the results cited in this section.
77
RCF can be characterized semantically as the first-order theory of the reals Th(R) or axiomatically via conjoining
to the axioms of an ordered field the statements that every positive number has a square root, that no sum of squares
is equal to −1, and every polynomial of odd degree in a single variable has a root.
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it – ‘is not contained as a constituent part of what is given through the conditions’. In particular,
Diagel(M) must not only extend the axioms T but it is also not even entirely determined by their
deductive consequences Thm(T).
Since it is well-known that theories capable of interpreting arithmetic do not decide metamath-
ematical statements like their consistency statements, this is an expected conclusion. But Ziegler’s
result shows that a version of this phenomena arises in the case of geometrical theories as well.
For although theories like HP are not essentially undecidable, a central reason why Hilbert was
originally interested in studying them is that they are far from being complete – e.g. HP does not
decide the Circle-Circle Principle (CCP), HP + CCP does not decide the Parallel Postulate (PP),
etc. As we have seen, these independence results were originally shown by specific model construc-
tions – e.g. the Beltrami-Klein and Poincaré models of non-Euclidean geometry, Hilbert’s model of
non-Desarguesian geometry, Dehn’s models of non-Archimedean or non-Legendrian geometry. But
as Ziegler’s result entails that there can be no procedure for determining if an arbitrary LH -sentence
ϕ is provable or refutable in HP, there is thus also no effective means of determining in which cases
such constructions are possible.
The current example thus also provides a concrete illustration of the significance of the unsolv-
ability of the Entscheidungsproblem within the domain of applications which first attracted Hilbert
towards mathematical logic. But it additionally illustrates that certain axiomatizations of geometry
share with arithmetic the property of admitting a wide class of models which need not be effectively
generated. For on the one hand it is possible to use Tarski’s decision algorithm for RCF to decide
whether a given ϕ ∈ LH is true in R. This also allows us to see that HP is satisfied in a countable
sub-model of R0 of R defined over the so-called real algebraic numbers (i.e. real roots of polyno-
mials with rational coefficients) whose atomic diagram is decidable. Thus while theories like HP do
not possess finite models, they are still effectively satisfiable in the sense discussed in §5.
On the other hand Ziegler’s result shows that this is by no means the only means of completing
HP. For we have also seen that such theories possess consistency proofs which can be carried out in
PRA and are thus arguably direct. On this basis I have argued in §5 that Hilbert and Bernays were
still in a position to acknowledge that models for these theories can be obtained by the application
of the Completeness Theorem. But in this case we can have no general guarantee that the resulting
structures will be contained – qua either atomic or elementary diagrams – in the axioms themselves
nor even that they can always be effectively generated by an auxiliary decision procedure.
This too illustrates a situation Bernays anticipated even before the incompleteness theorems
were announced:
We must only keep in mind the fact that the formalism of statements and proofs, with which we
represent our idea-formation does not coincide with the formalism of that structure we intend in the
concept-formation. The formalism is sufficient to formulate our ideas about infinite manifolds and to
draw from these the logical consequences, but it is, in general, not capable of producing the manifold,
as it were, combinatorially from within. (1930, p. 262)
Thus while it may be possible to maintain that consistency implies existence even from the finitary
standpoint, the former proof-theoretic fact need not be understood as entailing the latter model-
theoretic one in a manner which fixes completely the properties of the satisfying structure.
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